Flying Underground: The Trade in Bootleg Aircraft Parts by Luedeman, Robert W.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 62 | Issue 1 Article 6
1996
Flying Underground: The Trade in Bootleg Aircraft
Parts
Robert W. Luedeman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Luedeman, Flying Underground: The Trade in Bootleg Aircraft Parts, 62 J. Air L. & Com. 93 (1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol62/iss1/6




I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 95
II. THE LOSS OF AN AIRCRAFT ..................... 96
III. OF SALVAGE AND SCHEMES .................... 101
IV. AIRCRAFT PARTS FOR BEGINNERS ............. 102
V. WHAT IS AN UNAPPROVED PART? .............. 106
VI. THE STRANGE CASE OF THE SUICIDAL
MECHANIC AND OTHER STORIES: THE
UNDERGROUND PARTS CASES .................. 108
VII. THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION ................. 119
VIII. LIABILITY: TALES FROM THE DARK SIDE ..... 122
IX. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORTS:
PROBLEMS REVEALED OR POWER GRAB? ..... 130
A. REPORT ON AUDIT OF PRICING OF AIRCRAFT
PARTS R6-FA-3-036 ............................. 132
* Since this Article was written, certain key players in this controversy
regarding bootleg aircraft parts, most notably Inspector General A. Mary Schiavo
and the FAA's Anthony Broderick, have left the positions they held. The effect of
these changes is uncertain, but the author of this Article is certain that the
controversy which is the subject material of this Article will undoubtedly
continue.-ED.
** The author is ajourneyman aircraft mechanic and quality assurance inspec-
tor of 15 year's experience who is also a graduate of Drake University Law School
in Des Moines, Iowa, a member of the Iowa Bar, and an LL.M. candidate (Agri-
cultural Law) at the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville. He is currently fur-
loughed from his last assignment as a second shift flight ramp quality assurance
inspector for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation's Long Beach, California
plant, and he is a past member of UAW Local 148. The opinions and conclusions
in this work are his own. The descriptive material and technical digressions in
the footnotes and text are included because it was suggested by Professor Robert
Hunter in the early stages of this project that a general audience will better un-
derstand the issues when it has a good grasp of the technology under discussion.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
B. REPORT ON SURVEY OF SURVEILLANCE OF
FOREIGN MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT PARTS
RO-FA 4-001 .................................... 134
C. SURVEY REPORT ON PARTS MANUFACTURING
APPROVAL PROCESS R6-FA-4-007 ................ 134
D. REPORT ON AUDIT OF THE CERTIFICATION AND
SURVEILLANCE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
REPAIR STATIONS R4-FA-4-009 .................. 135
1. Control Strategies ............................ 136
a. Voting with Dollars .................... 136
b. The Benefits of One Stop Shopping... 137
c. Maintenance Support Plans ........... 138
d. The Aircraft Parts Authentication and
Tracking System (APATS) Program ... 139
e. Other Technologies of Interest ........ 141
f. Trademark Infringements, Unfair
Competition, and Other Legal
Strategies .............................. 143
g. Recent Legislative Efforts .............. 148
h. Other Statutory Avenues ............... 149
2. Toward a Rationalized System of Regulation-
Risk Assessment vs. Positivism ................ 150
a. Meaningful Quality Assurance and
Training ............................... 156
b. Mandatory Reporting of Suspected
Unapproved Parts Within Forty-eight
Hours-Designated Material
Exam iners ............................. 157
c. Mandatory Mutilation of Unretained
Parts ................................... 158
d. Manufacturer Serial Number/
Subsequent History Computer Bulletin
Board .................................. 158
e. Mandatory Registration and Licensing
of Parts Resellers ...................... 158
f. Standardized Portable Identification
Technology as the Primary Method of
Part Authentication and Verification .. 159
g. Rationalization and Limitation of the
PMA and Repair Station Rolls ......... 160
BOOTLEG AIRCRAFT PARTS
Mr. Med hitches up his grease-stained trousers, cocks his leather cap.
"Greenie," he says, "either a law is a good law, or it is a bad law.
What makes a good law?"
Greenie laughs good-naturedly and says, "Hell, Med, I ain't but a
grease-monkey like you. How would I know?"
Med takes his cap off, looks at it disdainfully, and slaps it back on
again.
"Was I to be your age, Greenie, and not know more than you, I'd hide
away under a bulkhead somewheres and have them bring me my meals.
Listen. A law comes out says you can't use a pot no more, it ain't sani-
tary, and it's a discouragement to the plumbing business. Is that a good
law?"
"For Christ's sake, Med," Greenie says, and he has a big smile on his
face.
"Of course it ain't. No sense to it. But the game law does have sense to
it: it says four duck and two geese a day as a limit per man. And it says
you can't put corn around the blind, nor use live decoys."
"I'll tell you," says Greenie, "we could have a higher bag."
"Some years it's big, some small, depends on how many birds there are.
But the law itself, now, never mind details, is it a good law?"
"You know the same as I do, Med, without some kind of a limit, you
wouldn't see or hear a wing the whole season long. I guess it's a good
law, but two things can spoil it: bad enforcement and bad hunters. You
might say good enforcement will take care of the bad hunters. I don't
know, though, when I think of some of those hunters. Talk about hogs,
why a hog's a dainty feeder compared to some hunters I can think of" 1
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FIRST PART of this Article examines what may be the
most egregious example of an air disaster where the proxi-
mate cause of the accident can fairly be attributed to failure of
counterfeit parts. This part also briefly surveys some of my own
personal experiences in the aviation repair business with regard
to the subject material. It then examines the current regulatory
scheme which, it is alleged, controls the certification and manu-
facture of legitimately produced aircraft parts. It examines the
phenomenon of underground parts, with particular emphasis
on internal, high value engine parts. Last, it presents a survey of
relevant legal and other material which was culled from various
sources and which, it is hoped, will convey to the reader the
1 VARLEY LANG, Fou.ow THE WATER 136-37 (1961). This dialog on the nature
of law takes place in a boatyard between two mechanics.
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serious nature of the subject material and some of the contro-
versy surrounding the viewpoints of various actors involved.
The second part of this Article examines control strategies
which are currently being used or promoted by various parties
to the issue, with attention to evolving legal approaches to the
overall issue of product counterfeiting. This part also suggests
that the world view of some in the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) is a sort of homegrown risk assessment which has an
insufficient statistical justification and a basis in personality.
The third part of this Article argues that a series of simple
control measures could be implemented relatively rapidly,
which could do much to promote better accountability from all
parties in the chain of aircraft parts distribution and thereby im-
prove air safety.
II. THE LOSS OF AN AIRCRAFT
Sometime in the afternoon of September 8, 1989,2 a
chartered Convair 580 operated by Partnair and bearing the
Norwegian registry number LN-PAA departed from Oslo, Nor-
way on a trip to Hamburg, Germany with fifty passengers and
five crew members aboard.4 The passengers were employees of
a shipping company who had been selected by lottery to attend
the christening of a ship.5 Late in the afternoon, all contact was
lost with the Convair as it approached the coast of Denmark,
2 Flight Safety Foundation Editorial Staff Report, Fatal Convair Crash Linked to
Suspect Parts, Improper Maintenance, FLIGHT SAFETY DIG., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 18
[hereinafter Convair] (citing Aircraft Accident Investigation Board of Norway, Re-
port on the Convair 340/580 LN-PAA Aircraft Accident North of Hirtshals, Denmark, on
September 8, 1989 (1993)).
s See THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PROPELLER AIRLINERS 220 (Bill Gun-
ston ed., 1980). In 1987, Northwest Airlines operated several of these battle-
scarred warriors on milk runs in the upper midwest, and I saw them regularly at
the Kalamazoo, Michigan airport. The Convair 580 was the product of a modifi-
cation program which originated in my home state of California. Id. The idea
was simple-remove the piston engines from existing Convairs and replace them
with the more powerful and reliable turbine engines then being produced by the
Allison Engine division of General Motors. Id. This hybrid design-a marriage
made in heaven-produced an aircraft which (some suggest) had reduced levels
of controllability, but enormous reserves of power and reliability. Other re-engin-
ing projects utilizing the Convair airframe and engines such as the Rolls Royce
Dart and the Napier Eland were less successful because of lower power output in
the case of the Dart and cancellation of the Eland program by Napier. Id.
4 55 Killed in Crash of Norwegian Plane None Aboard Survive as Craft Plunges into
Sea Near Denmark, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1989, at 4 [hereinafter TIMES].
5 Id.
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and the aircraft went down in the Skagerrak.6 Air and sea res-
cue workers had been alerted, and they discovered bodies litter-
ing the area near LN-PAA's last known position.7 Of the fifty-
five persons on board LN-PAA that day, none survived the crash
into the cold and unfriendly waters where the Baltic meets the
North Sea.' The aircraft apparently had experienced sudden
deceleration while the accident victims were belted in their
seats. 9 The first officer's body had an unbroken toothpick in his
stomach, which investigators assumed was indicative of "reflex-
ive action caused by sudden shock or surprise." 10 The loss of
LN-PAA was Norway's worst air disaster."
LN-PAA was a veteran of hard service in an unglamorous
trade, having had at least ten previous owners before Partnair.' 2
The aircraft had a total time in service on September 8, 1989, of
36,943 hours, and substantial parts of the maintenance records
and flight logs were missing or in Spanish.'3 Flight manual revi-
sions and other documentation related to the various modifica-
tions that had been made to LN-PAA during its life were
deficient or missing. 4  Thus, potentially unsafe conditions
might not have been understood by flight crew and mainte-
nance personnel, and unsafe operation, loading, and flight
might have gone unrecognized.
LN-PAA had undergone a series of major modifications (in-
cluding re-engining) under its several owners. In 1986, LN-PAA
had received an overhaul including new floors, new interior ap-
pointments, new heating and ventilation systems, major avionics
and radio upgrades, and other major system modifications and
repairs performed by Kelowna Flightcraft, a Canadian aircraft
repair and modification facility.' 5 During the course of these
repairs, Kelowna had occasion to install four new shear bolts
and sleeves in the vertical stabilizer attach points.'6 At that time,
Kelowna Flightcraft allegedly did not have an accounting system




9 See Convair, supra note 2, at 18.
10 Id. at 19.
11 TIMES, supra note 4, at 4.
12 Convair, supra note 2, at 21.
is Id. at 20-23.
14 Id. at 23.
15 Id. at 22-23.
16 Id.
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in place which allowed it to trace the origin of parts that it had
installed.1 7 Further, the auxiliary power unit front support had
been replaced at some unknown date with a shoddy substitute of
unknown origin which failed some time before the 1989
accident. 18
The three-year accident investigation conducted by the Nor-
wegian civil aviation authorities recovered ninety percent of the
wreckage of LN-PAA from the floor of the Skagerrak.1 9 The in-
vestigation disclosed that the recovered shear bolts and sleeves
from the vertical stabilizer did not comply with material specifi-
cations because of inadequate heat treatment after fabrication
and were well under the required strength for such parts.20 Ex-
cessive wear of these parts would have been undetectable with-
out a targeted inspection.2 ' The investigation also revealed that
a decision had been made to use the auxiliary power unit
throughout the flight to Hamburg, contrary to procedures in
the existing aircraft flight manual.22
17 Id. at 24.
18 Id. at 19. The auxiliary power unit is a small turbine engine which is installed
in the tail of the Convair 580. It is used as a source of electric power and com-
pressed air for starting the main engines and operating aircraft electrical, heat-
ing, and cooling systems while on the ground. This feature enables the aircraft to
operate with less need for ground services.
19 Id. at 19.
20 Id. at 23.
21 Id. at 28. These bolts were to have been removed so that the surrounding
structure could be inspected for cracks in 1989, but Kelowna Flightcraft had de-
cided, contrary to relevant maintenance instructions, to use a procedure for
crack detection which could not reveal the excessive wear then occurring in the
pins because it did not involve disassembly. Id. As a result, Partnair's mainte-
nance representatives refused to approve the alternate procedure and postponed
the inspection of the pins. Id. No other inspection of the attachments was made.
Id. However, at this time Kelowna did replace one pin and sleeve because of its
external appearance and used an erroneous and inferior repair procedure in so
doing. Id. It appears that at this point Kelowna should have been cognizant of
the deterioration then taking place in the structure. Id.
22 Id. at 25. The number one, or left-hand, engine generator was inoperative
at the time. Id. The flight crew determined that it would be safe to operate with
the auxiliary power unit and its generator in continuous operation, despite the
fact that the minimum equipment list, or MEL, did not allow such operation. Id.
The MEL had not been updated to reflect installation of the third generator, and
the dispatch decision was made based on a review of an MEL for a comparable
aircraft. Id. It is thought that the ultimate decision stemmed from the fact that
the emergency checklist allows this sort of operation when an in-flight main gen-
erator failure occurs. Id. However, the emergency checklist is intended for use
only with in-flight emergencies and not for dealing with routine equipment fail-
ures which would otherwise prevent dispatch of the aircraft in revenue service.
Id.
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It appeared likely from the recovered wreckage and recon-
struction of the last moments of LN-PAA, based on air traffic
control plots, flight data recorder tapes, and forensic evidence,
that the immediate cause of the destruction of LN-PAA and the
death of the occupants was structural failure brought about by
sudden and violent flutter in the control surfaces of the rudder
and elevators.2" Flutter is an uncontrollable, destructive oscilla-
tion of control surfaces which can be initiated where conditions
of vibration and excessive wear exist.2 4
The investigation revealed that the flutter in the tail control
surfaces of LN-PAA was precipitated by four factors which to-
gether led to the loss of the aircraft. Those factors were as fol-
lows: (1) improper airborne use of an inadequately restrained
auxiliary power unit which could have induced a high level of
vibration in the tail structure;25 (2) inferior maintenance which
could not and did not discover progressive deterioration in the
shear bolts and sleeves securing the vertical stabilizer;26 (3) the
shear bolts and sleeves themselves, which were of undetermina-
ble origin and quite evidently defective in manufacture; 27 and
(4) the auxiliary power unit support, which was of suspicious
28origin.
This recounting of the last hours of LN-PAA highlights for the
lay reader the extremely serious consequences of mechanical
failure in aircraft that may be directly attributed to parts of sus-
picious origin. Moreover, it shows that this particular event and
the deaths that resulted need never have happened if proper
maintenance procedures had been observed and if a system for
verification of part traceability and provenance had been in
place.29
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id. (citing JANE's AEROSPACE DIcrIONARY (Bill Gunston ed., 1988)).
25 Id. at 26.
26 Id. at 28-29.
27 Id. at 23.
28 Id. at 19.
29 One hesitates to call events of this type "accidents," when they clearly were
caused by aggravated negligence, if not reckless indifference of the worst sort.
For an account of another preventable disaster, see David Young, Aviation History
on Two Planes, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1994, at Transportation 5. Young describes
how Knute Rockne, the celebrated Notre Dame football wizard, lost his life. Id.
(Rockne was the only coach who ever had a car named after him, even if it was
only a warmed over Studebaker). The proximate cause of the event was unde-
tected dry rot and failed glue joints in the wing spars of the Fokker Trimotor in
which Rockne was a passenger. Id. The decay had gone undetected because the
wing's plywood skin could not be easily removed for inspections which would
1996]
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An important factor to remember, when considering argu-
ments on both sides of the underground parts issue, is that the
reason for the loss of LN-PAA was as clearly established as such
events are likely to be. Often the issue is less than obvious, and
the accident investigator must attempt to make sense of small
and unidentifiable fragments of burned debris scattered over a
large area or attempt to divine the cause of an accident where
the aircraft is never recovered, partially recovered, or only recov-
ered with great difficulty and expense. 0
The reader may also reflect on the cost incurred in compen-
sating victims of such terrible tragedies, as well as the expense
associated with the loss of a productive aircraft asset and the cost
of accident investigation, when evaluating so-called "economic"
arguments that have been advanced against regulation in the
field. 31 In this context, the reader may also consider where the
ultimate source of payment to satisfy these demands may be, if
such costs continue to be externalized by less responsible sectors
of the aircraft parts industry.32
have revealed the deterioration. Id. These events are a disgrace to the profession
and a stain on the reputation of aviation mechanics worldwide, which cannot
easily be overlooked.
30 For two cases concerning the standard of proof required to find negligence
in a case where the aircraft was never recovered, see Cox v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968), and Haas-
man v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951), affd sub nom.
Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922
(1953).
31 See generally Ed Foster, Aircraft Parts Firms Rip Proposed Rule, PHOENIX GA-
zETrE, Oct. 31, 1995, at El. In this article the president of a firm in Mesa, Arizona
says that an unapproved part has never caused an accident, he has never found a
part that was proved counterfeit, and proposed regulatory activity is a needless
layer of bureaucracy. Id.
32 These arguments are sometimes self-serving and often specious. In the case
of LN-PAA, 55 victims and their families no doubt received something in the way
of a settlement, insurance costs went up, and someone had to pay off on the
value of the aircraft. Partnair and its stockholders were deprived of the produc-
tive use of their asset and the revenue it could have produced, and whatever
traffic the aircraft had carried had to be spread over the existing pool of available
aircraft. Government workers from neighboring countries had to conduct an
unsuccessful search and rescue effort. Norway undertook a costly three-year in-
vestigation to determine the cause of the accident. The total cost of the bolts and
sleeves implicated in the accident was $1212. See Flight Safety Foundation Edito-
rial Staff Report, Bogus Parts-Detecting the Hidden Threat, FLIGHT SAFETY DiG., Jan.-
Feb. 1994, at 1.
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III. OF SALVAGE AND SCHEMES
When I was running an aircraft engine repair shop, I got the
occasional telephone call soliciting the purchase of the shop's
worn out parts for "salvage." The shop did not dispose of such
parts that it accumulated, not only for reasons of liability in the
event of a dispute with the customer but also because manufac-
turers had ongoing programs of research into new methods of
reconditioning formerly unsalvageable parts. Periodically, a
new repair scheme was announced, and the shop could obtain
reconditioned parts at a substantial savings.3 Thus, retaining
worn out parts could, under some conditions, allow the shop to
be more competitive in price without compromising quality. I
would always agree to sell the junk engine parts, but the caller
was warned that the part would be delivered in four pieces, and
any documentation would be sent to the manufacturer with the
notation that the particular part had been destroyed. Invariably,
that was the end of the conversation.
There are a multitude of ways to trade in aircraft parts, some
legitimate and some less so. A mechanic I knew received a visit
from FAA inspectors at the shop where we worked. It was his
task to explain to authorities why he had installed an alternator
belt on an aircraft which was clearly identified as a product of a
well-known manufacturer of lawn mowers.3 5 Another episode
occurred when a customer, against advice, bought several thou-
sand dollars worth of cut-rate turbine blades without documen-
tation and subsequently found that no reputable shop would
install the blades or balance his turbine rotor.3 6 Further, I was
aware of a repair facility in the region which represented its abil-
SS See GARRETr TURBINE ENGINE CO., REPAIR INFORMATION LETTER 82029 REv. A
(1983).
34 See generally 17 AVIATION WEEK GROUP, WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY BUYER'S
GUIDE (1994). This directory lists over 700 pages of aircraft and aerospace parts
suppliers, although some listings are cross-references by category. Also, see gen-
erally TRADE-A-PLANE, Dec. 23, 1993, which devotes a good part of its 200 or so
pages every ten days to the aircraft parts and sales trade, but caters more specifi-
cally to a general aviation clientele.
35 This true story is meant only to illustrate how legitimately produced parts
may be improperly introduced into the aircraft market and is not intended to
disparage a fan belt which was perfectly acceptable for the manufacturer's in-
tended use.
36 On many engines, installation of turbine blades requires specialized equip-
ment and subsequent rebalancing, either of the individual component or the
entire rotating assembly. On this customer's engine, rebalancing of the individ-
ual part had to be done utilizing trim balance information from the engine data
plate. Thus, the part had to rebalanced with reference to the entire rotating
1996]
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ity to "overhaul" Garrett turbine engines, when in fact the shop
had never been approved by Garrett or anyone else to overhaul
a Garrett product or perform more than minor repairs.3 7
I first looked at the issue of underground parts in an under-
graduate paper on the subject of international trade and the
aircraft industry.38 As part of that project, I became unpleas-
antly aware of the deviousness and ingenuity of those who mar-
ket bootleg aircraft parts. It was recently that I began to
consider the legal aspects of the underground aircraft parts in-
dustry. The following notes detail the results of my
investigation.
IV. AIRCRAFT PARTS FOR BEGINNERS
When a civil aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance is
designed, and a prototype is tested, the goal of the manufac-
turer is to obtain from the FAA the grant of an approved type
certificate so that the product can be offered to the market. 39 In
order for the product's airworthiness to continue, parts that are
installed must conform to the previously granted type design ap-
proval, with limited exceptions.40 The grant of the approved
type certificate means that the manufacturer has successfully
demonstrated that the aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance
design conforms with all applicable regulatory and design crite-
ria." It is, in all respects, an enviable mark of approval.
After obtaining type certification, a type certificate holder
must obtain production certification by demonstrating that each
duplicate aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance will comply
assembly, rather than in its own right. This customer eventually had to absorb
the loss from his ill-advised efforts at bargain hunting.
37 See generally FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION DRA-r ADVISORY CIRCULAR
AC20-62D (1995) [hereinafter AC20-62D], for a discussion of the misuse of this
and similar terms. Although this document has not yet been formally adopted, it
is a significant improvement on the previous edition, AC20-62C, which dates from
1976.
38 Robert W. Luedeman, The Commercial Aircraft Industry: Profiles And
Prospects 23-25 (Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the SMULaw
Review).
39 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-.293 (1995).
40 See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ADvisoRY CIRCULAR AC21-29A (1992)
[hereinafter AC21-29A].
41 Unapproved Parts and Aviation Safety: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of A. Mary Schiavo, Depart-
ment of Transportation Inspector General).
102
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with the type certificate. 2 The manufacturer must demonstrate
a high level of quality assurance to obtain certification .4  The
manufacturer demonstrates the airworthiness of successive
products of the same design by demonstrating that they con-
form to the type certificate. 44
Among other things, the approval thus granted presumes that
all the parts that comprise the finished product have been
tested, inspected, and approved and that the manufacturer's
quality assurance standards are an integral part of the airworthi-
ness determination for the complete product.
It ought to be readily apparent that variations from this
scheme, however minor, infringe upon the type certificate.
However, the regulatory scheme has six broad areas of excep-
tion which allow some flexibility:
(1) Standard parts, such as hardware, extrusions, small fasten-
ers, rivets, wire, bulbs, and the like, manufactured to industry
standards such as SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers), MS
(Mil. Spec.), AN (Army-Navy), or NAS (National Aircraft Stan-
dard) are presumed to conform with the standard identified by
their part number and are considered acceptable for installation
on certificated aircraft or products.45
(2) Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs) are granted for
modifications to the design of the original product.46 The appli-
cant for an STC must present test and engineering data which
demonstrates that the modification is air worthy.4 7 The design
modifications are approved by FAA and remain thereafter the
property of the designer or developer 8 and can be licensed to
42 Id.
43 Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (1994).
45 AC20-62D, supra note 37. See generally FLETCHER AIRCRAFT CO., STANDARD
AIRCRAFT WORKERS' MANUAL §§ 4-1 to -42 (12th ed. 1977), for a concise index
and description of some of the more commonly used standard aircraft fasteners;
and FRED H. COLVIN, AIRCRAFT HANDBOOK 717-76 (5th ed. 1942), for descriptions
of some SAE standard parts used in the aircraft industry.
46 G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc., 958 F.2d
896, 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993). The Rasmussen court
never decided the issue of whether the certification of airworthiness could be
valid in view of the irregular manner in which Kalitta obtained it. This issue has
significance in determining the validity of insurance policy exclusions based on
invalid airworthiness certificates. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
47 G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 899.
48 Id. at 906 (holding that use of an STC to obtain a government privilege is a
property right under California law, and one not preempted by federal law).
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aircraft owners or operators.4 The owner or operator of the
aircraft may, by incorporation of the STC, thus obtain the bene-
fit of a design modification without needing to recertify the en-
tire aircraft.5" Parts manufactured in conjunction with an STC
may or may not be produced by the original holder of the type
certificate, but are legitimate nonetheless and are acceptable for
installation on certificated aircraft, providing they conform
otherwise with the various regulatory schemes.-' Parts that are
used for a one-only STC are not required to be manufactured
subject to Parts Manufacturing Approval (PMA) authority be-
cause the FAA considers such parts exempt under 14 C.F.R. sec-
tion 21, subpart E.52
(3) Under 14 C.F.R. section 21.303(a), no one may produce
replacement or modification parts unless they hold a PMA.55
Exempted from section 21.303(a) are "(1) [p]arts produced
under a type or production certificate[,] (2) [p]arts produced
by an owner or operator for maintaining or altering its own
product[,] (3) [p]arts produced under an FAA Technical Stan-
dard Order[, or] (4) [s]tandard parts."54
A parts manufacturer is granted a PMA if he or she has
demonstrated that the design of the part meets current airwor-
thiness standards, and the manufacturer has a system in place
that ensures that each part produced is quality assured, made in
accordance with applicable design criteria, and is safe for use.55
The PMA process allows, among other things, for production of
parts to maintain the large fleet of obsolete aircraft whose type
certificate or production certificate holders may be defunct,
although in some cases the certificate holders for the product
are in existence and unhappy about losing sales to competitors
who have gained PMA approval for current production parts. 56
(4) Parts that have been produced in compliance with an ex-
isting Technical Standard Order (TSO) are considered to be ap-
49 Id. at 903.
50 Id.
51 See AC21-29A, supra note 40.
52 Id.
53 14 C.F.R. § 21.303(a) (1995).
5" Id. § 21.303(b).
55 Id. § 21.303(d).
56 See Air Transport FAA Approval Process Backed as Means to Curb Bogus Aircraft
Parts, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 20, 1992, at 33. Superior Air Parts devel-
oped its ability to manufacture replacement Teledyne Continental 0-200 cylin-
ders by reverse engineering and pays no royalties or license fees for what appears
on the face of it to be brazen piggybacking.
104
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proved.5 7 The TSO approval is an FAA design approval issued
to the manufacturer of an article which has been found to meet
a specific set of design and performance criteria.5 8 The TSO
approval is granted by way of a letter of acceptance59 or a letter
of design approval. 6° The part must be "permanently and legi-
bly marked with the name, address of the manufacturer, type,
part number or model designation of the article; the serial
number or date of manufacture of the article or both; and the
applicable TSO number."61
(5) Repaired or overhauled parts are considered acceptable
parts when the work is accomplished by a person or facility hold-
ing an appropriate certificate.62 These components may then
be resold, returned to service, or distributed through trade
channels. The operator of a repair station or the person re-
turning the part to service does not necessarily have to have the
blessing of the certificate holder, but the operator has to repair
the product in accordance with the applicable service and repair
information either from the manufacturer or from generalized
repair procedures.63 Additionally, it is possible for repairs to
components to be accomplished if a Designated Engineering
Representative (DER) acting on behalf of the FAA and within
the limitations of the enabling rules approves engineering infor-
mation necessary to return the part to service. 64 The bottom
line, however, is if there is no approved service or repair infor-
mation, then there is no repair scheme-no matter how well
thought out.65
(6) Parts produced by an owner or operator for repairing or
altering his or her own aircraft are considered acceptable.66
This category allows the owner or operator to fabricate simple
assemblies, manufacture fabric coverings, and construct sheet
57 See AC20-62D, supra note 37.
5 14 C.F.R. § 21.601. For a list of current Technical Standard Orders see FED-
ERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC20-110H (1993).
59 14 C.F.R. § 21.603(b).
6 Id. § 21.617.
61 AC20-62D, supra note 37.
62 Id.
63 For examples of what would constitute acceptable repairs of a generalized
nature, see FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC43-13-1A
(1972).
64 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1994).
65 See Administrator v. Aero Lectrics, Inc., NTSB Order No. EA-2934 (Apr. 7,
1989), availabLe in WESTLAW, 1989 WL 267467.
66 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of A. Mary Schiavo).
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metal parts and patches out of raw stock, among other things.
An owner or operator produces parts if the owner "participated
in controlling the design, manufacture, or quality of the part."67
With these exceptions, the holder of the type certificate is ulti-
mately responsible for the integrity of the components made
and installed under the type certificate. However, many type
certificate holders subcontract some or all of their production
to outside vendors, machine shops,job shops, and so on, but the
parts thus manufactured must conform in all respects with the
production and quality standards which were part of the origi-
nal certification basis of the airplane, engine, propeller, or
appliance.
Parts are identified as being in conformity with regulations
and type design by an FAA Airworthiness Approval Tag form
8130-3, a TSO number, the FAA-PMA symbol, data from a coun-
try which has a bilateral airworthiness agreement if properly cer-
tificated, or a document showing that the part was produced by
or for a manufacturer holding an approved type certificate or a
production certificate.68 Used, overhauled, or repaired parts
are commonly identified by an overhauling agency or repair
person as conforming with applicable regulations by attaching a
maintenance release, sometimes known in the trade as a "yellow
tag," or other documentation to the part in question.69
V. WHAT IS AN UNAPPROVED PART?
Periodically, a story appears in the popular press about "bo-
gus" aircraft parts, but there is little that is systematic in the defi-
nitions thus applied.70 Parts grouped under that popular
appellation may actually be the following: (1) completely coun-
terfeit goods;71 (2) parts produced by legitimate manufacturers
outside the chain of accountability that substantiates compli-
ance with the regulatory scheme of certification or distributed
without direct ship authority from the certificate holder;7 2 (3)
67 See AC20-62D, supra note 37, which gives a rather expansive and counterin-
tuitive view of what an owner or operator produced part consists. The author of
this Article is not comfortable with this view, based on his personal acquaintance




70 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of A. Mary Schiavo).
71 Id.
72 See AC20-62D, supra note 37.
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runout, cycled out7" or damaged parts that are salvaged after
removal from service and have been subsequently reintroduced
into the parts pool through the use of misinformed, deceptive,
improper, unapproved, inadequate, or fraudulent repair
schemes and documentation;7 4 (4) stolen parts; (5) commercial
parts which have been converted to aircraft use without passing
through more stringent aircraft inspection requirements; 75 (6)
parts and components which have been overhauled or repaired
without authorization and marketed using descriptors such as
"overhauled," "reconditioned," "like new," and so on;76 (7) parts
for which certification cannot be demonstrated for some un-
known reason; (8) parts manufactured to military or foreign air-
craft certification requirements which have been improperly
converted for Use on U.S. aircraft; (9) parts which have been
substituted without authority; (10) parts which have been mis-
represented as meeting certification requirements; or (11) any
combination of the above.
The FAA defines an "unapproved part" as follows:
A part, component, or material that has not been manufac-
tured in accordance with the approval procedures in [14 C.F.R.
73 The term "runout" is used in the industry to describe parts which are life-
limited (i.e., they must be replaced at regular chronological intervals and must be
removed because the allowable time in service has elapsed). The term "cycled
out" has a slightly different meaning. A cycle generally refers to one takeoff and
landing sequence; thus, one cycle may consist of several hours of flight. Failure
to closely monitor cycle counts can result in an operating hours penalty, as in the
absence of reliable documentation, and some amount of clock time may be com-
puted as one cycle. The penalty assessed depends on the manufacturer of the
product in question. Chronological requirements for life-limited parts are devel-
oped from service history, mean time between failure (MTBF) studies, extensive
manufacturer testing, predictive engineering analysis, and knowledge of the ma-
terial properties of the part and the environment in which it operates.
7 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of A. Mary Schiavo).
75 The typical examples of this class are ball and roller bearings manufactured
to industry standards, and electronic components purchased by part number or
electrical value, as well as the lawn mower belt, see supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text. Many in aviation are extremely casual about this sort of thing. For ex-
ample, see MARTIN CAIDIN, THE SAGA OF IRON ANNIE 144 (1979). A casual
inspection of a general purpose aircraft battery reveals that special features, such
as special vent caps with check valves, are included to control spillage of battery
fluids under flight conditions as well as to safely vent combustible battery gases.
One may also presume that the aircraft battery is constructed in a robust fashion
with a view toward limiting the liability exposure of the maker. Yet, ignoring the
clear import of all these considerations, the mechanics on the JU-52 restoration
project, instead of selecting a battery made expressly for airborne use, installed two Sears
& Roebuck car batteries, lashed together as a sort of homemade substitute. Id.
76 See AC20-62D, supra note 37.
19961 107
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
section] 21.305 or repaired in accordance with [14 C.F.R. sec-
tion] 43; that may not conform to an approved type design; or
may not conform to established industry or U.S. specifications
(standard parts). Such unapproved parts may not be installed on
a type certificated product, unless a determination of airworthi-
ness can otherwise be made."
Examples given by the FAA are as follows:
(1) 'Counterfeit' or fraudulently marked parts, components, and
materials; (2) Parts shipped directly to users by a manufacturer,
supplier, or distributor who does not hold, or operate under the
authority of, a production approval for the part (e.g., production
overruns); and (3) Parts that have been maintained or repaired
and returned to service by persons or facilities not authorized
under [14 C.F.R section] 43 or [14 C.F.R. section] 145.78
VI. THE STRANGE CASE OF THE SUICIDAL MECHANIC
AND OTHER STORIES: THE UNDERGROUND
PARTS CASES
Gary Shafer, a Long Island parts distributor, was charged with
supplying counterfeit seal spacer rings for Pratt & Whitney air-
craft engines.79 After a United Airlines technician ordered a
spacer from stock and found it to be of unknown quality and
unusual appearance,"° it was determined that the part was coun-
terfeit and had been produced by a Montreal workshop under
the control of Joe Furlat, a Canadian aircraft mechanic.8 "
Furlat had obtained production blueprints for the part from
an employee of Pratt & Whitney.82 Made of ordinary steel in-
stead of the alloy used in the genuine article, it was unclear
whether the parts Furlat made were adequate to perform safely
in the elevated temperature environment of a turbine engine. 3
Furlat continued to produce counterfeit aircraft parts, distribut-
77 See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DETECTING & REPORTING SUSPECTED
UNAPPROVED PARTS (undated brochure on file with the SMU Law Review). This
informative brochure is available without cost at any FAA Flight Standards Dis-
trict Office (FSDO) and from FAA Aviation Safety Inspector, Aircraft Certifica-
tion Service, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591.
78 AC21-29A, supra note 40.
79 More Than a Dozen Companies Used Bogus Parts, Newspaper Reports, AIR SAFETY
Wy., June 28, 1993.
so Id.
81 Andrew McIntosh, Plane-Parts Scam Flew Far; City Shop Turned Out Counterfeits





ing them in the United States through aircraft parts brokers like
Shafer.84 Furlat subsequently committed suicide by drinking a
quart of whiskey and taping a plastic bag over his head, perhaps
in an excess of remorse.85 Pratt & Whitney instituted a safety
program which uncovered 130 of the counterfeit spacer rings, as
well as numerous counterfeit seal rings and other parts in the
engines operated by several major airlines.86 The spacer rings
were also the subject of an FAA airworthiness directive.87
Some of the earlier examples of underground parts cases con-
cern vendors who attempted illegal substitution of parts that the
government had contracted to purchase. In some cases, the
vendor is involved in reselling parts to the government that the
vendor previously obtained as government surplus.88
In United States v. National Wholesalers,89 the successful bidder
on a contract to supply voltage regulators to the Army antici-
pated being able to obtain them from surplus stocks, but due to
design changes surplus regulators could not meet the requisite
specification. 90 National Wholesalers then manufactured copies
which were substantially equal to the genuine article, but
attached counterfeit Delco Remy labels to the regulators.9 1
Although the government discovered the deception, it accepted
the regulators because of the military emergency in Korea.92




87 See FAA AIRWORTHINESS DmEcrVE AD91-24-14, Jan. 3, 1992.
88 For a fascinating look at the buying and selling of military surplus and the
armaments business in general, see WILLIAM B. EDWARDS, CIL WAR GUNS 133-43
(1962). Buying surplus and selling it back to the government at inflated prices is
not a particularly new idea. General John C. Fremont, the so-called "Pathfinder
of the West," purchased Hall's patent breech-loading rifles to arm troops under
his command at the outbreak of the Civil War. Id. at 135-40. These obsolete
rifles were purchased as surplus from government stocks by New York specula-
tors, one of whom wasJ.P. Morgan, for $3.50 each. Id. at 136-37. The rifles were
sold back to the government at about $22 each on Fremont's order. Id. at 135.
Fremont never lived this episode down, and it may have ruined his career. Id. at
140-41, 143. Was Fremont wrong? Arguably so. However, 5000 of Fremont's
men were armed with good serviceable rifles, albeit of an obsolete pattern, when
shoulder weapons of any quality were scarce, no mean accomplishment in the
late summer of 1861. Id. at 143.
89 236 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
90 Id. at 946.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 948.
93 Id. at 950.
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firming what a label ought to represent, said, "[T] he American
label guarantees contents are the product that the label repre-
sents them to be, and that is true whether the label is on Bethle-
hem's steel or Mrs. Lerua's tamales."94
In United States v. Aerodex, Inc.,95 a vendor contracted to supply
the United States Navy with master rod bearings of a certain
type and part number for its Curtiss-Wright R1820 aircraft en-
gines.96 Because it did not obtain bearings conforming to the
part number and specification that the Navy had ordered, Aer-
odex obtained an earlier type of bearing made with a less robust
alloy, reworked the bearing surface, and re-identified the bear-
ings with the part number ordered by the Navy.97 The bearings
thus modified were not distinguishable from the contracted arti-
cle.98 A number of the bearings were installed, and when the
Navy discovered that the bearings supplied were not those which
it had ordered, it removed and replaced them at a cost exceed-
ing $160,000.'9
Aerodex alleged that the reworked bearings were inter-
changeable and just as serviceable as those the Navy had or-
dered, and thus they did not have the intent to cheat the
government that the statute requires.100 Aerodex argued that all
information available to them indicated that the parts were to-
tally interchangeable.101 The court, relying on National Wholesal-
ers, determined that deliberate mislabeling of the bearings,
combined with the fact that the product was not what the Navy
had ordered, made Aerodex subject to the False Claims Act '02
because if Aerodex truly believed that the parts were totally in-
terchangeable, there would have been no incentive to deceive
94 Id. at 948.
95 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally COLVIN, supra note 45, at 122.
Unlike the typical auto engine, the cylinders of a radial piston engine like the
R1820 are disposed in a circle around a central crankshaft with a single crank-
shaft throw. One cylinder is directly connected to the crankshaft by means of a
"master rod," and the other cylinders are in turn connected to the master rod
through link rods. It is difficult to imagine an aircraft part more critical to flight
safety than a master rod bearing in a radial engine. Failure of this part means
immediate and catastrophic engine failure, and the consequences of failure
under full takeoff or war emergency power settings are extremely grave.
96 Aerodex, 469 F.2d at 1005.
97 Id. at 1006.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1007.
10, Id.
102 See 31 U.S.C. § 3279 (1970).
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the Navy.103 The court also held that the Navy's failure to exer-
cise the one hundred percent inspection clause of the agree-
ment was not a waiver of the quality requirement.1 0 4 The part
number that Aerodex had applied to the bearings after it had
reworked them was a misleading indication of conformity to
quality and fabrication standards, and a Navy inspector would
have conducted the Rockwell hardness test which would have
detected a softer and less robust alloy only where fraud was
suspected.105
In another case with similar facts, United States v. Franklin Steel
Products, Inc., °6 Franklin Steel Products contracted to supply
master rod bearings to the Navy and, like Aerodex, supplied an
earlier type of bearing which had been replated and renum-
bered.1 0 7 The court held that Franklin was liable to the govern-
ment for the consequential damages which flow from a breach
of warranty, the breach being found in the failure to supply the
parts for which the customer had contracted.108 In the agree-
ment that it had signed with the Navy, Franklin expressly war-
ranted that the parts, notwithstanding the inspection clause,
conformed in all respects to the specifications listed. 0 Conse-
quently, Franklin could not assert that the government had
waived the inspection clause.'1 0
In both Aerodex and Franklin Steel, the courts held the vendors
liable for damages which were a proximate result of the breach
of warranty. The Franklin Steel court concluded that since the
bearings were required to support Naval aviation in the Mediter-
ranean and Far East fleets, and since the aircraft were danger-
ous because of the bearings, the Navy's emergency refit program
was justified and taxed that expense to Franklin Steel.111
A more ambitious attempt to defraud the government by sup-
plying spurious parts was uncovered in 1987 when Donallco, a
well-respected California manufacturer of aircraft parts and
dealer in military surplus, was indicted and subsequently con-
victed of defrauding the government by supplying parts that it
103 Aerodex, 469 F.2d at 1008.
104 Id. at 1009.
105 Id. at 1009-10.
106 482 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
107 Id. at 403.
108 Id. at 404.
109 Id. at 402.
110 Id. at 403.
M1 Id. at 404.
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had manufactured itself, but held no license to produce.1 1 2
Donallco had improperly obtained a series of production draw-
ings for certain proprietary fuel pump couplings and drive
shafts which were originally manufactured by Pesco and later by
Sundstrand when it purchased the Pesco division from Borg-
Warner.1 13 Donallco manufactured these parts in its own shop
without authorization and represented to the government that
the parts were surplus, manufactured by Pesco, which had been
obtained by Donallco from the Norfolk, Virginia Naval Air Sta-
tion in prior years. 1 4
The deception accomplished two objectives. First, Donallco
obtained business at the expense of Sundstrand, owner of the
right to manufacture the parts in question by making parts with-
out a license or under proper quality assurance supervision, thus
lowering its production and license costs. Second, by represent-
ing that the parts were surplus and had been made by Pesco,
Donallco bypassed the more stringent inspection requirements
of MIL-I-4208, which is mandatory for current new production
of parts.1 5 Evidently the fact that Donallco was defrauding both
the owner of the rights to manufacture the pump shafts as well
as the government and was caught red-handed was lost on
Donallco's counsel when he insisted that tests had proved that
the parts were "safe."' 1 6
The fraud might have gone undiscovered if Donallco had not
submitted parts to the government which were dimensionally in-
correct and which were rejected by United States Air Force in-
spectors at Kelly AFB, Texas.1 1 7  Donallco's government
contracts administrator subsequently learned of the existence of
the clandestine manufacturing scheme and system of bookkeep-
ing which allowed the parts to be passed off as surplus, and he
took incriminating evidence concerning the production of the
parts as well as samples of the parts when he resigned his
position.1
William Allred and several other officers of the company were
convicted of conspiracy and making false statements in connec-
112 United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1989).
113 Id. at 859-60.
114 Id. at 861.
115 Id. at 859 n.4.
116 See David Freed, Company Allegedly Sold "Bogus"Jet Parts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1986, at Metro 1.
117 Allred, 867 F.2d at 863.
118 Id. at 863-64.
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tion with procuring government contracts. 119 On appeal, the
court concluded that the evidence uncovered the existence of a
"complex and remarkable scheme to covertly manufacture air-
craft parts for distribution as new, unused surplus."120 The plan
defrauded the government since it bypassed the quality assur-
ance program the government established to guarantee that all
new parts it buys are approved by government inspectors. 12 1
Significantly, this was not the first time that Donallco found
itself having to defend its misrepresentation of the provenance
of parts it sold. In the early 1980s, General Signal Corporation
(GSC) sued Donallco for misrepresenting parts as new stock
from GSC's New York Airbrake division, subsequently pursuing
Donallco for contempt for failing to observe the terms of a con-
sent decree.1 22 Donallco had sold parts to two firms, Aviation
Methods and Field Aviation, and had represented that the parts
were new and unused, when in fact they were not.123 In addi-
tion, Donallco had passed off parts which had been repaired by
using an unapproved chrome plating process as new, and
Donallco had stated that the parts met FAA standards when, in
fact, the parts did not.12 4 Ultimately, the court upheld the dis-
trict court's finding of contempt against Donallco, but re-
manded the case to the lower court for a redetermination of the
penalties involved because it was unclear whether the penalty
was compensatory or coercive. 25
Ontario Air Parts and several of its officers defrauded the FAA
and several firms that purchased parts from them by represent-
ing that the combustion liners which Ontario sold had been ap-
proved for use in civil aircraft by the FAA, when in fact they had
not.126 Ontario Air Parts also represented that some of its parts
had been manufactured by General Electric, when they had
not. 2 7 The actual manufacturer of some of the combustion lin-
ers was Masbe, a Taiwanese firm which supplied the parts to the
119 Id. at 859.
120 Id. at 872.
121 Id.
122 General Signal Corp. v. Donalico, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1986),
app. after remand, 933 F.2d 1013 (1991).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1380.
126 California Parts Firm, Two Managers Plead Guilty in Bogus Parts Scheme, U.S.
Department of Transportation News Release 81-94, June 2, 1994, available in
WrsrAw, 1994 WL 237318.
127 Id.
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Republic of China Air Force for use on its Northrop F-5
aircraft. 128
The J-85 engine installed in the F-5 is manufactured by Gen-
eral Electric. 129 It is similar but not identical to the commercial
CJ-610,130 an engine installed on civil aircraft such as the Jet
Commander, Israel Aircraft 1121/1123 series and early Lear
products. The military combustion liner produced by Masbe is
superficially similar to the civilian product, but differs in impor-
tant details and is therefore not considered to be
interchangeable. 13 1
Ontario Air Parts also sold Masbe combustion liners to the air
forces of Thailand and Turkey and did not disclose that the lin-
ers were not General Electric products. 132 At least one engine
failure on a military aircraft in Turkey was attributed to the
Masbe part.'3 3 Ontario Air Parts also obtained military combus-
tion liners, which had been produced by General Electric but
were illegally altered and sold to them for use on civilian
engines. 134
Aeroheat, an aircraft service facility, was awarded a limited re-
pair station certificate in 1985 which allowed it to repair com-
bustion tubes for Janitrol heaters by, among other things,
welding them.1 35 Subsequently, it was determined that the cer-
tificate had been incorrectly granted since Janitrol's repair man-
ual prohibited repairs by welding. 136 The certificate also did not
describe the combustion tubes which were to be repaired by
part number or model and provided no standard by which the
repairs would be evaluated to ensure that the work met the qual-
ity standards of the production certificate holder-in this case,
Janitrol. 1 7 Enforcement was delayed to allow Aeroheat to bring
its processes into compliance with regulations because it was
thought that the repairs being done were good quality work.'3 1
128 See Michael A. Dornheim, California Firm Admits Selling Unapproved CJ-610







135 Aeroheat, Inc. v. Hinson, NTSB Order No. EA-4066 (Jan. 18, 1994), avail-






Aeroheat continued to overhaul Janitrol combustion tubes us-
ing the unapproved process, refused to comply with amended
certificate restrictions, and refused to post the limits to its repair
station certificate. 39 Consequently, Aeroheat's repair station
certificate and any airman certificates were revoked in 1989.140
The operator had been informed that he needed to either ob-
tain a Parts Manufacturing Authority, Supplemental Type Certif-
icate or cease performing the work he was involved in, but he
overhauled at least seventy-eight combustion tubes without hav-
ing the appropriate technical data which would have allowed
him to perform the work.14' Mere visual inspection of the re-
paired parts was an insufficient basis for approval, and the regu-
lations require that work be done in accordance with approved
manuals or methods. 42  Subsequently, the case was settled
before a hearing on the merits, and Aeroheat was granted PMA
status, but it did not win its appeal of the order denying attorney
fees. 143
Aero Lectrics had its Repair Station Certificate revoked for
performing unapproved major alterations on 22 Lucas aircraft
generators and certifying a blower as overhauled without having
the approved technical data available.' 44 Rocky Mountain Air-
ways had experienced difficulty in obtaining generator housings
for its DeHavilland aircraft, 145 and Aero Lectrics devised a repair
process to salvage otherwise unusable housings by machining
the bearing surfaces oversize, chrome-plating the surfaces, and
regrinding them to standard size.' 46 This process had never
been approved by the manufacturer or by the FAA, and Aero
Lectrics never obtained approval for its process.14 7 In its appeal,
Aero Lectrics argued that the repair constituted preventive
maintenance because it involved application of preservative ma-
terial and, thus, was not a major alteration requiring approval by
the manufacturer or the FAA. 4 The board disagreed, holding
that complex disassembly procedures and unapproved grinding
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at *5-6.
142 Id. at *2.
143 Id.
-" Administrator v. Aero Lectrics, Inc., NTSB Order No. EA-2934 (Apr. 7,
1989), available in WEsTLAw, 1989 WL 267467, at *1.
145 Id. at *6.
146 Id. at *3.
147 Id. at *6.
148 Id. at *2.
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and plating operations consisted of unapproved major altera-
tions because they change the design of the part by introducing
new material. 4 9 In another instance, Aero Lectrics repaired a
blower for Rio Airways and certified that it was overhauled using
Rio Airways technical data.1 50 However, Rio Airways never had
any technical data to overhaul the blower and could not have
had it since no overhaul manual from the manufacturer existed
at the time.15 1
In 1977, Whittaker Controls prevailed in an unfair competi-
tion action in which it alleged that Execuair, a parts vendor,
had counterfeited its hydraulic aircraft parts and passed them
off as the genuine Whittaker product, when in fact the parts
were not.15 2 Whittaker was awarded injunctive relief 155 Evi-
dently, Execuair had produced or obtained counterfeit hydrau-
lic actuators for the Lockheed C-141 Starlifter cargo aircraft that
is used by the United States Air Force.15 4 Finding that Execuair
was in contempt of the original order, the trial court adopted
the remedies proposed by Whittaker which required that Ex-
ecuair desist from using part numbering systems substantially
similar to Whittaker's and ordered the destruction of all parts
and inventory held by Execuair1 55 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the destruction of only the infringing goods, holding
that destruction of non-infringing goods is impermissible. 56
Cutler-Hammer, a well respected manufacturer of electrical
components, brought action against Standard Relay Company
and Universal Relay Company for selling aircraft relays bearing
Cutler-Hammer trademarks which were salvaged goods that
were modified to look like new Cutler Hammer relays.'5 7
Others were of undetermined origin that had had counterfeit
labels applied. 58 This was accomplished by applying AN (Army-
Navy) numbers to surplus, used, reconditioned, or defective
-4 Id. at *3.
150 Id.
151 Id. at *4 n.5.
152 Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1992).
153 Id.
154 See Gregory Crouch, FAA Investigation Centers on Van Nuys Firm Probe Puts
Spotlight on Bogus Plane Parts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1988, at 9A.
155 Whittaker Corp., 953 F.2d at 512-13, 518.
156 Id. at 519.
157 Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Standard Relay Corp., 328 F. Supp. 868, 869




parts.159 Universal applied counterfeit nameplates and inspec-
tion stamps to similar outdated or defective parts and thereby
passed them off as current production. 160 The part numbers,
stamps, and nameplates thus applied indicated compliance with
performance standards that the relays had not, in fact, met."'1
When manufacturers and repair stations order relays for air-
craft use, they do so by ordering MS (Mil. Spec.) or AN (Army-
Navy) part numbers. 62 The numbers indicate that the part has
been qualified and conforms to a certain set of discrete per-
formance and inspection standards. 6 3 The manufacturer or re-
pairman relies on the part number as evidence that the part has,
in fact, been qualified to the applicable specification and relies
on the reputation of the manufacturer of the relay that the parts
have been qualified.16' In view of the fact that Standard and
Universal produced catalogs which depicted Cutler-Hammer
products with MS numbers, 6 ' serious misrepresentation was
found in the defendants' practice of procuring obsolete military
surplus relays and applying current MS or AN numbers to con-
vey the impression that they had been qualified by Culer-Ham-
mer.166 Universal had purchased copies of nameplates and
relabeled the relays with the counterfeit labels. 167
Manufacturers of aircraft subassemblies purchased relays
which contained unapproved hardware, were painted in areas
which were required to be bare metal, and contained parts
which could not have been manufactured after 1955.168 The de-
fendants had, in other words, rendered a large number of old
relays into their component parts, segregated the parts, and
reassembled the accumulated components into a sort of bastard
relay and identified the resulting product with a genuine part
number and trademark. 69
Magno Palacios, a West Hartford, Connecticut resident who
manufactured parts for Pratt & Whitney, was charged by state
authorities with larceny because he placed Pratt & Whitney
159 Id. at 873-75.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 880.
162 Id. at 871.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 872.
165 Id. at 873.
166 Id. at 874.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 875.
169 Id.
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trademarks on aircraft parts he manufactured without authority
to do so, subsequently disposing of the parts through a
broker. 170
A senior quality control inspector at the Lucas Industries
transmission plant in Park City, Utah was indicted as a result of a
government fraud inquiry.1 71 Lucas Industries had previously
pled guilty to thirty-seven counts of fraud and paid a fine of
$18.5 million dollars. 172 Lucas Industries produces transmis-
sions for military aircraft and falsified test reports when the
gearboxes failed the performance and durability test require-
ments.1 73 The inspector directed employees to report that trans-
missions had passed quality control tests, when in fact they had
failed. 174
Lucas Industries also agreed to pay an $88 million civil settle-
ment in the matter, and it is alleged that the transmissions Lucas
Industries supplied for 1,500 military aircraft were responsible
for engine fires and aborted takeoffs and had a shorter than
expected service life.175 In three separate associated actions
concerning fraudulent certification and testing of military parts,
Lucas Industries has had to pay $118 million in fines and
penalties.176
Dominic Rvocco received a thirty-seven-month federal prison
sentence and was barred from working in the aviation business
for three years after release. 77 Rvocco was convicted of conspir-
acy and mail fraud in the manufacture and sale of unapproved
aviation gaskets.' 78 One of Rvocco's companies, Amcorp, manu-
factured the gaskets, and another of his companies, Ramco, sold
the gaskets by mail order. 79 Ramco represented that the parts
were FAA approved, when in fact Amcorp did not have approval
170 Robin Stansbury, Larceny Alleged in Use of Pratt & Whitney Label, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 17, 1995, at B1.
171 See Ted Cilwik, L.A. Grand Juiy Indicts Ex-Inspector at Lucas Western's Park City




175 See Andy Pasztor, Lucas to Pay U.S. $88 Million, Record Pact with Defense Firm,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at B6.
176 Id.
177 See Christopher Mumma, Saddle River Man Sentenced in Aircraft Parts Scheme,





to manufacture the gaskets.180 The sentence Rvocco received
was the maximum allowed under the federal sentencing guide-
lines, and U.S. District Court Judge Ackerman, perhaps in an
excess of hyperbole, referred to his conduct as "heinous."181
VII. THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION
Honest manufacturers of certificated aircraft products typi-
cally invest a large amount of capital in development, substantia-
tion, and oversight in an effort to deliver a product that
conforms to the type certificate. Much of this effort is devoted
to design, quality assurance, inspection, and reliablity engineer-
ing of parts which may then be subcontracted to smaller manu-
facturers to produce. The price that is charged for the part is
partially representative of the cost of the engineering support
services and quality assurance associated with the finished
product.
The price the part sells for also reflects overhead costs associ-
ated with carrying adequate liability insurance, providing prod-
uct support and technical services, and maintaining adequate
stocks of parts to meet eventualities. It is also, to some degree,
reflective of the cost associated with maintaining services and
inventories for product lines which have slow turnover or slim
profit margins, as well as providing for an adequate return on
investor dollars. 18 2 A further cost escalator is that quality assur-
ance and testing at a level that assures conformity with the type
certificate typically produces a high number of rejected parts,
which may not be easily repaired or otherwise recycled.
Economic incentives to circumvent the established system of
certification and oversight are provided by the fact that compli-
ance with certification and oversight exponentially increases the
cost of parts obtained through legitimate channels. The evader
can offer the product at a much lower price because he or she is
not burdened with high overhead and consequently does not
need to recapture these expenses. Another loophole for evad-
ers exists because there are currently no restrictions on trading
in damaged, worn out, or otherwise unserviceable aircraft parts
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 For example, McDonnell Douglas Corporation provides limited technical
and engineering assistance for aircraft which have not been made for forty years
and more. Every scrap of ship's record paper is carefully microfilmed and cata-
logued, and the original copies are securely stored. It is presumable that the
other aircraft manufacturers have similarly costly documentation systems.
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in place."8 3 Consequently, large quantities of aircraft materials
exist in a regulatory vacuum, with the ever present possibility
that substantial numbers of these parts may be improperly con-
verted back into the pool of legitimate spare parts. Those who
buy and sell such material, so long as they do not actually install
it on certificated products and have not misrepresented it, may
well be beyond the reach of regulation.
Another economic incentive of a negative sort is found in a
decided reluctance to disclose the existence of a suspect part
183 For a good discussion of metallurgical problems in the gas turbine engine,
see G. GEOFFREY SMITH, GAS TURBINES ANDJET PROPULSION 117-34 (5th ed. 1951).
"Hot section" parts in turbine aircraft engines operate under special conditions
which affect their airworthiness and require a somewhat extended discussion.
The hot section is generally considered as that area directly exposed to the ele-
vated temperatures of combustion, and special periodic inspections of the com-
ponents within the defined hot section are required. Both rotating and fixed hot
section parts encounter temperatures not far removed from the range where
plasticity sets in. Id. The chemistry and distribution of the fuel or atmospheric
constituents, combined with elevated temperatures, can have an adverse effect on
the life of the component parts. Rotating parts are subjected to high levels of
centrifugal stress, and turbine blades are subject to extreme gas temperatures
and velocities, stratified temperature gradients, and torque. In essence, the
blade, which is set at an angle to the gas flow to capture its energy and extract
work, is constantly attempting to rotate on its vertical axis. The blade undergoes
blade creep, a progressive and predictable plastic deformation, and stresses at
the blade root which, combined with the heat encountered, may cause cracks to
appear and propagate quickly both in the blade and also in the rotor itself. Id. at
117, 122. When a new blade is installed and subjected to heat and rotation inside
an engine, a short period of high creep ensues, followed thereafter by a steady
and predictable rate of creep. Id. As the end of the useful life of the blade ap-
proaches, the rate of creep begins to rise and abruptly escalates until the blade
fails. Id. The safe life of hot section parts is highly predictable over time if cycles
and hours of service are carefully monitored. Such monitoring allows timely and
safe removal of parts nearing the end of their useful life, as well as allowing for
efficient recapture of any remaining useful life on such parts which have been
salvaged. Environmental and operating excursions such as hot starts, overheat-
ing, and overspeeding adversely affect the useful life of such parts, and often
parts must be taken out of service prematurely in such a case. However, the parts
thus removed, on visual inspection, appear similar to the serviceable part. Thus,
the only way for the subsequent purchaser to distinguish between such parts in
the absence of accurate documentation is by destructive inspection of the part
itself. Since the grain structure of metal is in some respects thermographic, a
section of a turbine blade or other hot section part, if sliced, etched, and ex-
amined under the microscope, can in some circumstances reveal the tempera-
ture to which the metal has been subjected. The reason for this technical
digression is to point out that large numbers of extremely expensive turbine en-
gine parts which have been damaged beyond repair and which cannot be easily
distinguished from acceptable parts exist in a sort of gray market of sale and
resale, and spurious documentation may then be generated to fraudulently as-
sure the resale customer of the value and utility of the parts.
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found on an aircraft or in inventory. It may be feared that dis-
closure could precipitate adverse action by regulatory authority
against the operator's certificate. Such an operator may be also
financially unable to absorb the loss that disclosure would force.
The operator would then have only the uncertain remedy of a
civil action against the supplier and might thus decide to let
sleeping dogs lie. Additionally, no violation of the installer's
certificate presently occurs unless an unairworthy part is in-
stalled on a certificated product-mere possession of unair-
worthy parts is no offense, assuming that the origin, source, and
identification of the part is otherwise legitimate and has not
been misrepresented. 184 Thus, such a discovery might well lead
to a quiet disposal effort. In other cases, the operator may not
want to look too closely at a good deal.185
Product counterfeiting is unfortunately not unique to the air-
craft industry.186  In the transportation industry, counterfeit
hardware and other parts have plagued the over-the-road truck-
ing business for years. 187 One commentator has estimated that
184 Installation of unapproved parts has negative implications concerning the
airman's license because the mechanic is required to certify airworthiness. For a
case which elaborates on the theme of certifying airworthiness and the sometimes
hard choices that conscientious aircraft mechanics are called on to make, see
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 224243 (1994).
185 See Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of A. Mary Schiavo) (indicating a new
and aggressive stance in enforcing the law in this field). Among the statutes Schi-
avo cites that are used against offenders are 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting);
18 U.S.C. § 32 (endangering flight safety); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy); 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements including deliveries of inferior or untested parts
or unapproved substitution and falsification of test reports and certification as
well as false customs declarations); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (interstate
transportation of stolen property); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (trademark infringement);
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (trafficking in counterfeit goods or services); 18 U.S.C. § 542
(false customs declarations); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (smuggling); and 19 U.S.C. § 1304
(mislabeling country of origin).
186 For some other examples of product counterfeiting, see James Bikoff, Imita-
tion Is the Most Dangerous Flattery, Says an Expert-Counterfeit Products Can Kill You,
PEOPLE WYLYx., June 3, 1985, at 110 (farm machinery, luggage, corn oil, wine,
transmission parts, agricultural chemicals, transistors, medical equipment,
drugs); Peter Carty, Fakes'Progress, ACCoUNTANCY, Dec. 1, 1994, at 44 (antibiotics,
computer parts, bicycles, liquor, compact disc recordings, sneakers, statuary);
Todd Mason, How High Tech Foils the Counterfeiters, BUSINESS WK., May 20, 1985, at
119 (oil filters, clothing, birth control pills, credit cards);Jed S. Rakoff & Ira B.
Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting: The Inadequacy of Existing Remedies, 73 TRADEMARK
REP. 493, 496-513 (1983) and cases cited therein (detailing historical origins of
product counterfeiting).
187 See Donald E. Tepper, Protecting Yourself Against Counterfeit Bolts, PRrVATE
CARRER, Oct. 1988, at 14, 17.
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American importers imported over one billion counterfeit bolts
from Japan between 1974 and 1985.188 These bolts were deliberately
misidentified by the manufacturers at the request of the importers
although the manufacturers did not sell counterfeit bolts in their own
country.'89 Due to the fungible nature of hardware generally, the
bolts found their way into the pool of parts available for replace-
ment use or supplied to component manufacturers. 9 ° Some re-
pair facilities, worried about a rash of "fifth wheel" fastener
failures, discovered that the aftermarket bolts they used to se-
cure fifth wheels were both counterfeit and inferior.' 91 Another
truck repair shop found that most of its stock of Grade 8 bolts
were counterfeit.192
VIII. LIABILITY: TALES FROM THE DARK SIDE
Aviation maintenance facilities and service personnel have
often been found liable under general principles of negligence
or breach of contract, and courts most often use these principles
of analysis in the absence of specific statutes or ordinances.'93
188 Id. at 17.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 16. I once personally witnessed from afar some of the effects caused
by an overturned trailer load of liquid propane. Given the potential for this sort
of misadventure on the highway, it is difficult to comprehend the sort of reckless
indifference to consequences which Tepper describes.
192 Id.
193 See Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Liability for Alleged Negligence of Independ-
ent Servicer or Repairer of Aircraft, 41 A.L.R. 3D 1320, 1322 (1972 & Supp. 1995)
[hereinafter Brazener, Liability]; see also Stephen C. Kenney, Recent Developments in
Aviation Law, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1995). The General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) limits liability to a period
of eighteen years following installation of a new part. Kenney, supra, at 80. The
Act is prospective and does not protect the manufacturer who knowingly misrep-
resents or withholds information in the application for a type or airworthiness
certificate. Id. A nonstatutory exception to state liability exists under the federal
common law "government contractor defense." Under the holding in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) where the United States ap-
proved design specifications for military aircraft, the equipment conforms to the
specifications, and the manufacturer warned the government about dangers not
known to the United States, liability cannot be imposed on the military, contrac-
tor. Id. at 82. See also Stefan A. Kaiser, What Can Be Done About Bogus Aircraft
Parts?, 19 AIR & SPACE L. 298 (1994). In the European Union, when mainte-
nance organizations, aircraft operators, and other parties purchase aircraft parts
outside the European Economic Area, they are strictly liable as importers under
domestic laws implementing Commission Directive 85/374, art. 3 § 2, which
states that "liability without fault on the part of the producer (of industrially pro-
duced movables) is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to
BOOTLEG AIRCRAFT PARTS
In American Airways, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,194 one of the funda-
mental cases bearing on the liability of aircraft repairmen, the
court found that an aircraft owner has the right to rely on a
repairman's performance."' In that case, a critical part was
gravely flawed, and the defendant failed in his duty to conduct a
proper inspection and advise the customer of recommended re-
pairs as he was required to do by the agreement between the
parties.1 96 Consequently, the court held the defendant liable for
breach of contract by way of dereliction of duty, and the dam-
ages assessed included sums paid to third parties by the insur-
ance carrier.197 This case concerned a defect that the pilot
could not have detected by the use of reasonable care in per-
forming a preflight inspection, and it is significant to note that
the case was decided on a contract theory.
In a case decided on the common law of bailment, a ten-
inch-long screwdriver was discovered in the wreckage of an Aer-
onca which had crashed, allegedly because the controls had
jammed.198 The screwdriver was of a type used by the repair fa-
cility, and its location in the underbelly of the aircraft was such
that it could have interfered with the flight controls before be-
ing dislodged by the force of the accident. 99 The court held
that the flying service was under a common law bailor's duty to
inspect and furnish an airplane which was reasonably fit for its
intended use and to take reasonable care in so doing.200
Although the flying service argued that the cause of the accident
was the fledgling pilot's inexperience and negligence, the court
found that, in a case of circumstantial evidence, a jury could
reasonably have found that negligence of the repairer was the
cause of the loss of control and the accident that followed.201
our age, of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent
in modem technological production." Id. at 298. If the importer brings in a
defective, counterfeit, or unapproved part, not even the most rigorous inspection
will allow the importer to avoid liability because the importer in such a case is
held strictly liable. Commission Directive 85/374, art. 7 does not offer the im-
porter the possibility of exculpation based on the exercise of reasonable care. Id.
at 299.
194 10 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 1939), judgment modified, 17 N.Y.S.2d 998 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 31 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1940).
195 Id. at 820.
196 Id. at 818-19.
197 Id. at 820.
198 Aircraft Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Gantt, 52 So. 2d 388, 391 (Ala. 1951).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 392.
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In cases where the defect was such that it would have been
detected by a preflight inspection or exercise of ordinary care,
liability of the repairman is more difficult to establish. In Vroo-
man v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,20° the court found the standard of
liability to be "whether the airplane was defectively made or re-
paired, and if so whether the manufacturer or repairer had
knowledge of the probable danger of such defects and could
have reasonably foreseen or anticipated the consequent harm to
this appellant."2 0 3 This holding may be compared to Lock v.
Packard Flying Service, in which a pilot took an aircraft from a
maintenance shop that had removed the rudder for repairs and
failed to notice the rudder was missing.204 The court held that
removal of the rudder without warning did not constitute negli-
gence because the repairman could not have reasonably antici-
pated that a qualified pilot would not make a preflight
inspection and notice such a defect.2 0 5 It appears that in this
case the primary responsibility of the pilot was to perform an
adequate preflight inspection, and the pilot's actions were, in
the court's words, "grossly negligent acts. 20 6
Similarly in Kenty v. Spartan Aircraft Co., 20 7 a pilot who left only
a general description of his aircraft with service personnel could
not hold them liable after they serviced the wrong aircraft.2 08
The unfortunate Mr. Kenty was killed in another airplane crash
before his case came up on appeal.20 9 The license number of
the plane that was actually serviced by Spartan was noted on the
service ticket, which was handed to the pilot for his signature. 0
He complained about the amount of oil that had been provided
and was directed by Kenty to sign the service ticket, which he
did.2 11 Both Kenty and his pilot never checked the fuel gauge
that was visible to both of them, and as a result, the plane ran
out of fuel after a period of time and crashed. 12
However, in a case where there was some evidence of negli-
gence on the operator's part, the court found that the mere fact
202 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
203 Id. at 481.
204 Lock v. Packard Flying Serv., 173 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Neb. 1970).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 519.
207 276 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).




212 Id. at 930.
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that the plaintiff was somewhat negligent did not excuse the de-
fendant's negligence in improperly assembling an engine which
seized and caused a forced landing.213 Although the record of
ten flights between Miami and Havana by the operator revealed
significant operating problems with the right engine of the op-
erator's Curtiss C-46A such as high oil temperatures and erratic
governing, the undisputed fact that the engine had been im-
properly assembled in a fundamental way outweighed any negli-
gence on the part of the operator. 14
In summary, it may be inferred from the principles in the
cases that where a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that repair
personnel knowingly or negligently installed parts which were
not certified or were otherwise obtained through extralegal
channels, and those parts were the proximate cause of an acci-
dent, and the pilot could not, through the exercise of ordinary
care detect the nonconformity, a breach of duty as well as
breach of contract would be established. Correspondingly,
where it can be demonstrated that the pilot knew of the noncon-
formity and chose to operate the aircraft anyway, the repairer's
liability would be more difficult to establish. As it was held in
the American Airways case, operators and pilots, as well as the
public, must rely on service persons to do their job properly.2 1
It would be necessary only to demonstrate that someone, some-
where in the chain of control from procurement to installation
and inspection knew or should have known that a part was not
certified and therefore not airworthy to impute liability to the
repair facility.
A cautionary tale is presented by Fagerquist v. Western Sun Avia-
tion for parts installers who install defective or inferior parts. 6
In what would have otherwise been a routine product liability
213 Aerodex, Inc. v. American Int'l Ins. Co., S.A., 265 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir.
1959).
214 Id. at 291-93.
215 American Airways, 10 N.Y.S.2d at 820. For another case which illustrates this
principle in stark terms, see Ingle v. Swish Mfg. Southeast, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 506
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding a repair shop liable when a pilot ran out of fuel and
crashed). Although the repair facility was instructed to perform a "complete in-
spection" of the aircraft, the facility (1) ran the aircraft on the ground for two
hours and did not inform the operator, and (2) did not calibrate the fuel level
probes even though the shop knew the fuel gauges had been replaced, and thus
the system required recalibration. Id. at 508. Like the American Airways case, Ingle
represents the grossest sort of neglect on the part of a repair facility and a dis-
grace to the profession.
216 Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App.
1987).
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case concerning the installation of a defective cylinder on an
aircraft which crashed, killing the pilot, Western Sun was held
liable for a $1.5 million judgment.21 7 Western Sun attacked the
damage award as excessive. 1 The record revealed that the
manufacturer of the defective cylinder settled quickly with the
plaintiff for $20,000, leaving Western Sun alone to shoulder the
burden of the award.2 19
Insurance carriers in such a situation might be less than
happy to defend such an operator. Most, if not all, aviation lia-
bility insurance policies contain exclusions from liability in the
event the aircraft is operated in violation of applicable rules or
regulations.2 °
In Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. O'Brien,221 a declaratory judg-
ment issued by the trial court stating that insurance policies cov-
ered the loss of an aircraft destroyed in a midair collision while
being operated by a renter was reversed by the New Mexico
Supreme Court.222 The court held that under state law, a clear,
unambiguous exclusion applied to void a policy when the air-
plane lacked a current annual inspection, even though there
was no causal connection between the accident and the lapsed
airworthiness certificate.2 23
In Coren v. Puritan Insurance Co.,2 24 the court held that an ex-
clusion for lack of a valid airworthiness certificate was applicable
when mechanics had disabled the torque-sensing oil lines on a
helicopter's engines, which created the potential for the en-
gines, if operated, to exhaust their oil supply.2 25 The pilot, two
friends, and three female companions took the aircraft from the
repair facility and went for an unauthorized ride after drinks at
a nearby tavern, and the helicopter crashed when the engine oil
Was lost.
226
217 Id. at 634-35.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See generally Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Risks and Causes of Loss Covered
or Excluded by Aviation Liability Policy, 86 A.L.R. 3d 118 (1978 & Supp. 1995) (here-
inafter Brazener, Risks].
221 662 P.2d 639 (N.M. 1983).
222 Id. at 641.
223 Id. at 64041.
224 362 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).




In O'Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Co.,227 the Colorado
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, although it ap-
peared from the record that only a paperwork violation ex-
isted.2  In the lower court, it was shown that the one hundred-
hour inspection that was performed on the airplane by a
mechanic with an Aircraft and Powerplant (A & P) rating was
identical to the annual inspection that must be conducted by a
person holding an Inspection Authorization (IA) rating.229 Nev-
ertheless, the court found the exclusion applicable.23 0 In his dis-
sent, Judge Coyte of the appeals court noted that federal air
regulation is so pervasive that "virtually no plane crash [occurs]
without the violation of at least one regulation."21  The Colo-
rado Supreme Court affirmed, noting that "when the regulation
is clearly or implicitly safety-related, the application of the exclu-
sion should be precluded by public policy only where the in-
sured can show that the violation of the regulation was not a
cause of the accident."23 2 The plaintiff had not made an affirm-
ative showing that the violation was not the cause of the
accident.23 3
In Potter v. Ranger Insurance Co.,234 the court, applying Alaska
law, held that an exclusion applied to deny coverage to persons
who operated an aircraft without a valid airworthiness certifi-
cate, whether or not they know that the certificate is ineffec-
tive.23 5 The court held that the only reasonable interpretation
of the exclusion clause was that the company did not want to
insure airplanes that do not have their airworthiness certificates
in full effect.23 6
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Polytech Industries, Inc.,237 a policy
exclusion was upheld which unambiguously declared that the
aircraft could not be operated unless in accordance with the
terms of the current airworthiness certificate, including an an-
227 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985).
228 Id. at 285-86.
229 O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1183.
232 O'Connor, 696 P.2d at 286.
233 Id.
234 732 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1984).
235 Id. at 744.
236 Id.
237 655 F. Supp 1058 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1987).
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nual inspection .23  Although the insurer demonstrated no
causal connection between the exclusion and the accident, the
defendant in error did not disprove causal connection.3 9 On
these facts, the court determined that the specific exclusion in
the policy demanded summary judgment for the insurer.
Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court reached a different re-
sult, based on public policy objections. In Puckett v. United States
Fire Insurance Co.,24 1 the court held that a breach of the Federal
Air Regulations in and of itself would not trigger an exclusion
unless a causal connection was shown between the breach of the
regulation and the accident.2 42 The fact that the aircraft had
not had the inspection required to maintain the airworthiness
certificate was not the cause of the accident. 24 In a strongly
worded opinion, the court found that where an accident had
been caused by pilot error, it was a violation of public policy and
produced an impermissible result to allow the exclusion to
shield the insurer from liability.244
In a case of first impression in Iowa, an insurance carrier at-
tempted to avoid liability on an exclusion based on the pilot's
failure to obtain a medical certificate and a lapsed airworthiness
certificate. 245 The pilot had not seen the actual policy exclu-
sions and had not been informed that his failure to obtain a
valid medical certificate could deny coverage to him. In any
event, the cause of the destruction of the Cessna 210 was pilot
error in a landing accident.2 46 Applying Iowa law, the court
held that Iowa Code section 515.101 is intended to preclude in-
surance companies from avoiding liability due to risks which do
not contribute to losses.247 By comparison, the South Dakota
Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in a case with
similar facts. In Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance
238 Id. at 1065.
239 Id. at 1061.
240 Id. at 1063.
241 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
242 Id. at 938.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 212. IowA CODE § 515.101 (1995) allows the holder of a contract of
insurance to defeat the exclusion, despite how it is characterized, if he or she can
show that failure to observe the provision or the violation of the provision did not
contribute to the loss.
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Co.,248 a pilot whose medical certificate had lapsed was involved
in an accident which destroyed a club Cessna 177.249 The court
stated that a different way of construing aviation insurance ex-
clusionary clauses other than their plain meaning was better left
to legislative action. 5 °
The majority of decisions," however, hold that exclusion
clauses which are clear and unambiguous in their intent may
jeopardize insurance coverage where the validity of the airworthiness
certificate is in controversy, as it would most certainly be if it was
shown that conformity with the airworthiness certificate could
not be demonstrated because of the installation of unapproved
parts, regardless of causation. 51 Moreover, the issue of causa-
tion would not have to be established to prejudice the repair-
man's case, since discovery of such a situation and the threat of
disclosure to ajury would undoubtedly damage an otherwise in-
nocent repairer's chances for a favorable outcome on the mer-
its. In some cases, courts have held that a finding that an
aircraft was not properly equipped, and thus unairworthy, would
support a finding of liability against the operator in favor of per-
sons killed or injured in an accident, a point of some signifi-
cance for the installer of unapproved parts.
In Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd,2 52 the pilot of a DC-3 op-
erated by the defendant reported a malfunction of the only ADF
radio receiver installed in the aircraft at the time the aircraft was
turned over to the next pilot and crew. 53 Disregarding this in-
formation, the flight crew departed en route to an airport which
was experiencing limited visibility.254 Under instrument flight
conditions, the pilot reported that the ADF receiver was not op-
erating properly and had not picked up the outer marker.255
The plane continued for approximately twenty miles before
crashing into the side of a mountain.256 The court found that
the DC-3 was unairworthy because of the malfunctioning receiver and
248 540 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1995).
249 Id. at 645.
250 Id. at 646.
251 For a more complete discussion of the subject of exclusions from aviation
liability insurance policies, see Brazener, Risks, supra note 220; and Puckett, 678
S.W.2d 936 and cases cited therein.
252 355 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
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should not have been dispatched. 57 Under the circumstances,
the court found that a jury could have found that the operator
had been negligent because of the plane's condition.2 58
In Sleezer v. Lang, 59 a Beechcraft Bonanza, which had been
chartered for a trip from South Bend, Indiana to Omaha, Ne-
braska, attempted to make an emergency landing on an un-
lighted airstrip, apparently because its fuel had run dangerously
low. 26  While attempting to land at Atlantic, Iowa, the pilot
landed in a soybean field short of the runway, and the aircraft
nosed over, injuring the occupants.2 61 The pilot was apparently
unable to see the airstrip and could not illuminate the area
since the aircraft was not carrying flares, as required.262 The
court held that "violation of any provision of a federal statute, or
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder which are in-
tended to assure the safety of travelers in airplanes, is not negli-
gence as a matter of law but may be considered with other
evidence in deciding an issue of negligence." 263
IX. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORTS: PROBLEMS
REVEALED OR POWER GRAB?
Industry observers are concerned about an emergent rift be-
tween the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspec-
tor General (OIG) and officials of the FAA. 264 The Inspector
General and her associates have aggressively pursued suspected
unapproved parts suppliers and have alleged that some within
the FAA are unconcerned about suspect unapproved parts.265
By their testimony some persons inside the FAA do not ap-
pear to be convinced that the underground parts industry repre-
sents a threat to public safety. 266 This point of view discounts
the demonstrated existence of fraud in the industry and does
not convey the message that the persons who hold this view are
taking a proactive stance on the subject of air safety. Some sug-
257 Id.
258 Id. at 446.
259 102 N.W.2d 435 (Neb. 1960).
260 Id. at 442.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 445.
263 Id.
264 See Don Phillips, Personal Feud or Professional Problem ? DOT Official's Attack On
FAA Veteran Stuns Aviation Community, WASH. POST, July 16, 1995, at Hi.
265 Id.
266 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of David R. Hinson).
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gest the Inspector General is "grandstanding," but the number
of criminal cases that have been investigated and successfully
prosecuted appears to support the theory that the FAA has been
less than vigorous in enforcement.2 67
It does not appear to be necessary or desirable to wait for a
catastrophe to imagine the existence of a threat to the integrity
of the air transport system from bad parts. The three-year inves-
tigation concerning LN-PAA 268 pinpointed substandard parts as
a critical factor in the chain of causation which led to the acci-
dent, but the FAA does not include this incident in their statisti-
cal base because the aircraft was foreign registered.2 69 It is
apparent to even the casual student of causation that inferior
and untraceable parts had a significant part in this incident, and
the position of the FAA concerning this matter is disingenuous
at best.
The differences that existed between the FAA and OIG
erupted when Federal lawmen searched the Phoenix shops of
Advanced Turbine Services (ATS) and Southwest Turbine, Inc.
in 1992, acting on a report that ATS had performed unapproved
repairs on turbine engine parts.2 v Investigators traced some of
the repaired parts to Canada, and airworthiness authorities
grounded an airliner after some of the parts at issue were traced
to one of the aircraft's engines.2 7' It was found after an engine
inspection that some of the parts had failed.272
The proprietors of ATS were charged with "endangering
flight safety,"2 73 but counsel was able to show that the National
Transportation Safety Board did not consider that broken tur-
bine blades affected flight safety.274 Subsequently, charges were
dropped against the proprietors of the repair facility, their facil-
ity was recertified by the FAA, and the inspector who first re-
ported that an issue of flight safety existed was reprimanded for
267 See Elizabeth A. Marchak, FAA Unable to Keep Junk Parts Grounded, PLAIN
DEALER, Aug. 7, 1995, at lA. (noting that the Inspector General recently reported
that her office's efforts have produced 139 indictments, 111 convictions, $44 mil-
lion in fines, and 22 judicial actions and investigations in progress).
268 See Convair, supra note 2, at 22.
269 Elizabeth A. Marchak, Bogus Aircraft Parts Proliferate, Senate Panel Begins Hear-
ings, PLAIN DEALER, May 23, 1995, at IA.
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his "unprofessional behavior. "275 It was determined by a govern-
ment-hired testing laboratory that the blade at issue that had
failed did so because of metal fatigue and not as a result of the
repairs. 76
The existing tension then erupted into open warfare with
chief safety official AnthonyJ. Broderick over the relative exist-
ence of any danger to safety of flight in the case. 77 Some argue
Broderick's conduct in this affair may have prejudiced the U.S.
Attorney's case in the matter. 78 Inspector General A. Mary
Schiavo recently suggested that Broderick was under investiga-
tion by the FBI and ought to be removed from office.279
The Inspector General has issued audits of various agency
functions that are critical of FAA monitoring and activity in the
suppression of the trade in unapproved parts.2 80 The following
is an abstract of significant parts of the reports.
A. REPORT ON AUDIT OF PRICING OF AIRCRAFT
PARTS R6-FA-3-036
This report is part of a survey intended to ascertain whether
"reasonable prices" were paid for parts and whether approved
parts with acceptable documentation were being purchased by
the agency.2 81 The audit was conducted in 1992 at the FAA lo-
gistics center.28 2 Seventy-one part numbers were randomly se-
lected from 4963 part numbers held in the FAA stockrooms. 283
Some 1331 unit parts of the 71 part numbers were checked to
determine if there was adequate documentation and traceability
for new parts, and whether repaired parts could be traced to






280 See generally DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, REPORT ON AUDIT OF PRICING OF AIRCRAFr PARTS R6-FA-3-036 (1993) [here-
inafter R6-FA-3-036]; REPORT ON SURVEY OF SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN
MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT PARTS RO-FA4-001 (1993) [hereinafter RO-FA-4-001];
SURVEY REPORT ON PARTS MANUFACTURING APPROVAL PROCESS R6-FA-4-007 (1994)
[hereinafter R6-FA-4-007]; REPORT ON AUDIT OF THE CERTIFICATION AND SURVEIL,
LANCE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS R4-FA-4-009 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter R4-FA-4-009].
281 R6-FA-3-036, supra note 280, at iii.
282 Id. at 2. The FAA logistics center is located at the Mike Monroney Aeronau-




manufacturer's current parts catalogs.2 4 The investigators also
surveyed thirty parts already installed on three aircraft operated
by the FAA.285
The auditors concluded that thirty-nine percent of the sur-
veyed line items contained at least some unit parts that could
not be traced to an approved manufacturer. 6 Some parts were
made by manufacturers operating without Parts Manufacturing
Authority (PMA) approval, and manufacturers of some of the
parts could not be identified.287 For example, four pressure
switches which were in FAA stockrooms had had the actual pro-
ducer's name ground off and replaced by a PMA designation.8
Investigation revealed that the PMA holder did not have author-
ity to produce the parts in question, never inspected them, and
in fact had obtained them from a parts broker.28 9 The PMA
holder was unable to test or inspect the switches, and had not
done so, before applying the etched PMA number signifying ap-
proval.2 90 The actual manufacturer did not have PMA approval
to produce that particular pressure switch. 91
An analysis of thirty parts installed on FAA aircraft which had
not been purchased from primary vendors found that eight out
of the thirty parts were "suspect."29 2 The report argues that air-
worthiness of the FAA aircraft could have been substantially
compromised because the quality of the parts installed was un-
determinable. 3  It was found that FAA personnel had not re-
ported instances of suspected unapproved parts because no
procedures had been established to perform this task, and no
investigation of suspected unapproved parts was undertaken by
the agency with reference to work conducted in its own shops.294
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 3.
287 Id. at 4.




292 Id. at 6.
293 Id.
2% Id. at 10.
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B. REPORT ON SURVEY OF SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN
MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT PARTS RO-FA-4-001
This audit examined FAA surveillance of foreign manufactur-
ers and suppliers of aircraft parts in 1992.295 The audit con-
cluded that the FAA was not conforming to its own internal
procedures for identifying so-called "priority parts" or determin-
ing whether foreign manufacturers and suppliers required sur-
veillance of their operations.296 Priority parts are defined by the
agency as "parts which, if they were to fail, could be reasonably
expected to cause an unsafe condition in the end product. 297
The auditors found that the agency believed it did not have the
necessary resources to conduct required inspections and had
not requested those services from foreign authorities, although,
under bilateral agreements, it had the right to do so.29
Notwithstanding this, the FAA inspected domestic manufactur-
ers for French civil aviation authorities without charge or in ex-
change for reciprocal services.2 99 The audit concluded that the
lack of adequate surveillance was a "material weakness" in the
FAA's internal control systems and that the agency had "no rea-
sonable assurance that foreign manufactured priority parts were
being manufactured or inspected in accordance with applicable
procedures or approved designs.""'
C. SURVEY REPORT ON PARTS MANUFACTURING APPROVAL
PROCESS R6-FA-4-007
This audit evaluated the PMA grant process, compliance mon-
itoring program, and verifiability of the PMA list.30 1 It con-
cluded that the aircraft replacement parts manufacturing
community largely ignores regulations governing PMA author-
ity, most notably those who manufacture and ship parts without
direct ship authority.3 12 Original equipment manufacturers are
those who supply material on contract to certificate holders, and
their practice of shipping parts directly to the end user without
295 RO-FA4-001, supra note 280, at 2.
296 Id. at 3.
297 Id. at 4.
298 Id. at 5.
2 Id.
300 Id. at ii.
301 R6-FA-4-007, supra note 280, at iii.
302 Id. at 4.
134
BOOTLEG AIRCRAFT PARTS
approval short circuits the certificate holder's quality assurance
system, which was a basis for the original certification. 3
It was also determined that the FAA was hesitant to enforce its
own rules on the subject because some within the agency fear
the effects of shortages that would be created by a policy of ag-
gressive enforcement. °4 The audit also showed that the list of
PMA holders was inaccurate, not current, and incomplete.0°
Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether a manufacturer
even had PMA authority, except on a case by case inquiry. A
sampling of parts approved by one FAA office showed that the
PMA list was inaccurate in fifty of sixty-six cases.30 6
D. REPORT ON AUDIT OF THE CERTIFICATION AND
SURVEILLANCE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN REPAIR
STATIONS R4-FA-4-009
This report, issued in 1994, is an audit of the FAA certification
and monitoring process for repair stations.30 7 The auditors used
the agency's own criteria to uncover whether approved parts
were being used by the repair facility.308 If the facility could not
demonstrate conformity with the type certificate either by physi-
cal marks or supporting documentation, the part was consid-
ered "suspect."3 0 9 By this standard, forty-three percent of newly
purchased parts at the surveyed repair stations could not have
approval validated or conformity with industry or FAA standards
conclusively established.3 1 0 Ninety-five percent of parts obtained
from parts brokers had insufficient information of this type
tending to support approval.31 1 Parts were uncovered which
were counterfeit, made by unapproved producers, or which had
been purchased directly from vendors without direct ship au-
thority from the certificate holder.312 In addition, many facili-
ties were using obsolete repair and maintenance publications
313
and had improperly substituted parts without authority.
314
303 Id.
304 Id. at 7.
305 Id. at 12.
3W Id.
307 R4-FA-4-009, supra note 280, at iv.
308 Id. at 4.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 11.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 16.
314 Id. at 22.
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Reasonable minds may differ concerning the degree of
problems revealed by the audits. It is also possible to take issue
with the methods used in arriving at the conclusions that were
reached. However, it is not possible to deny the existence of
problems within the agency. The reports point to the existence
of a systemic and ongoing breakdown in the FAA's own internal
control mechanisms, both with regard to its administration of its
own procedures and with regard to the maintenance of its own
fleet.
One would have hoped that the FAA would have been able to
conclusively demonstrate that the parts in its own warehouses, at
a very minimum, could satisfy its own criteria, but that has not
proved to be the case. The report of the agency's own task
force, which was convened in 1995 to study the issue, concluded
that unapproved parts are circumventing the existing network
of controls and are entering the system.1 5
It may also be inferred that since much of the FAA Suspected
"Unapproved Parts" Task Force's report addresses information
gathering and exchange issues, a lack of adequate information
concerning the problem exists at the agency, and the actual
scope and nature of the problem may be unclear to the agency.
Thus, to conclude, as FAA Administrator Hinson did, that no
threat to air safety exists when the agency has not yet been able
to adequately identify the scope of the threat is to indulge a taste
for self-delusion. 1 6
1. Control Strategies
a. Voting with Dollars
The simplest and most effective strategy to protect the aircraft
operator or shop owner from most underground parts is to de-
velop and prioritize purchasing policies that tend to favor the
original manufacturer of the product in question or their ap-
proved vendors or repair facilities. The primary manufacturer
or vendor of a part or product in the majority of cases has a
continuing interest in marketplace survival and has a reputation
315 FAA SUSPECTED "UNAPPROVED PARTS" TASK FORCE, SUSPECTED "UNAPPROVED
PARTS" PROGRAM PLAN, Oct. 6, 1995, at 1-3 [hereinafter PROGRAM PLAN].
316 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of David R. Hinson). Administrator Hin-
son states, "The Safety Board has not identified the use of any unapproved part as
a cause in any air carrier accident." Id. On this reading, the Board must have
been unaware of the crash of LN-PAA or chose to totally discount the report of
competent Norwegian civil aviation authorities.
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to uphold in the aviation community. Such a manufacturer or
vendor is more likely to have the financial resources and insur-
ance coverage to meet any loss and is much more likely to be
able to draw on the proprietary expertise and processes neces-
sary to properly manufacture or recondition a part. The manu-
facturer or vendor closest to the source of manufacture is also
more likely to be able to supply proper documentation, resolve
questions concerning traceability, as well as have superior access
to product support services and data.
The aircraft owner or operator is in a commanding position
to refuse or reject the services of repair facilities that cannot pro-
vide assurances that the products they supply are legitimate and
traceable and to refuse to trade with vendors who cannot or will
not provide adequate product support. It is helpful in this con-
text for the owner or operator to remember that there is a cer-
tain correlation between the price he or she pays for parts and
the amount of liability insurance a vendor is likely to be carry-
ing. Direct inquiries about the extent and quality of a vendor's
liability coverage are in order, and the economics of this issue
are fairly clear.
The individual operator of a repair facility is also in a com-
manding position to compel resellers to produce adequate doc-
umentation demonstrating conformity for the parts they sell, for
many of the same reasons. Voting with dollars is an effective
control strategy and a sure fire attention getter.
The down side of this strategy is that it makes it more difficult
for the operator of a repair facility to compete for work without
some other method of underwriting the generally higher cost of
parts purchased from sources close to the original manufac-
turer. It also raises the overall amount that the aircraft owner or
operator is likely to have to pay out for a comparable level of
service, assuming that the services that are provided under such
widely divergent philosophies of operation can ever be equated.
b. The Benefits of One Stop Shopping
Manufacturers can provide incentives for the operator to
specify the factory-approved part by making warranties and cost-
sharing programs contingent on a demonstration that repair
parts installed in the engine or aircraft have been obtained from
approved sources. A strong selling point for the service man-
ager bidding on ajob is making sure the aircraft owner under-
stands and has given adequate consideration to these facts. As
part of this strategy the repair facility can promote itself as a
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value-added organization which takes the time and devotes the
effort to research such issues and does its utmost to protect the
operator's investment.
Additional incentives can be developed to make the repair fa-
cility more attractive, in spite of generally higher prices for
parts. Developing the expertise to repair and overhaul prod-
ucts, within the scope of a factory-approved program, can be
used to offer inducements in the fight to win customers and off-
set high prices for parts. As an example, one of the facilities I
worked for had developed the expertise and obtained factory
approval to overhaul and repair the more common types of pro-
pellers. Since the profit margin on propeller overhauls is rather
high and the shop's cost in labor and materials was relatively
low, propeller overhauls were routinely used as loss leaders to
attract aircraft operators to patronize the shop when bidding on
the hot section repair or engine overhaul. Similar programs of
factory approved overhauls for starters, generators, hydraulic
components, magnetos, cylinders, and accessories were mar-
keted with similar results.
c. Maintenance Support Plans
Some manufacturers offer maintenance support programs
which provide enrolled operators of selected products with ma-
jor financial protection regarding scheduled or unscheduled
maintenance. For a set fee per hour of operation, which is re-
computed yearly to reflect the performance of the pool of en-
rolled products, maintenance other than routine maintenance
is subscribed by the manufacturer.317
This plan and others like it are remarkably similar to health
insurance plans and can yield significant benefits for the aircraft
owner or operator. The maintenance service plan allows the op-
erator to budget maintenance money for the entire year. Such a
plan yields significant financial and tax advantages, since it is
not necessary to provide a reserve against unscheduled mainte-
nance. The only restriction on the operator is that some sched-
uling freedom is lost, particularly where service bulletins or
modifications are required, and the choice of repair facilities is
limited to those that have been approved by the manufacturer.
317 For a short description of a maintenance service plan, see GARRETr TURBINE




Of course, two major disadvantages of these plans are that they
are voluntary and only apply to selected product lines.
For the manufacturer, the service plan can limit exposure to
suspected unapproved parts because the maintenance facility
has already been assessed and qualified and, thus, is something
of a known quantity. It can be expected to be conservative in its
parts purchasing practices, and the manufacturer always has a
certain amount of oversight concerning the maintenance facility
and its inventory. The manufacturer also has oversight over the
operator regarding service bulletin and modification compli-
ance as well as scheduled maintenance.
Some manufacturers also use a carrot and stick approach to
induce operators of their products to avoid suspected unap-
proved parts. They may wield the warranty cancellation sword
to extract compliance from operators who are not enrolled in
MSP programs. Some manufacturers are also known to utilize
informal "cost protection" incentive programs to rebate mainte-
nance costs to operators who are otherwise in compliance with
warranty rules regarding the source of parts used to maintain
the product.3 18
d. The Aircraft Parts Authentication and Tracking System
(APATS) Program
Avmark, a private aviation consulting and management firm,
in association with technology giant Xerox, is attempting to de-
velop and promote a parts identification and authentication sys-
tem, with Avmark supplying marketing muscle and Xerox
supplying technical expertise, which, it is asserted, will "elimi-
nate the use of unapproved or non-airworthy parts in the air-
craft industry. 319
The proposed APATS system consists of marking and sensing
technologies.32 ° Using a variety of technologies suited to the
particular item, such as microengraving or microholograms,
which are embedded in a transparent coating applied with a
spray gun, the system would allow verification by use of a variety
of sensing and detection technologies, including optical scan-
ners, mechanical scanners, and passive transponder interroga-
318 The one program of this nature that I am familiar with is not described in
any of the manufacturer's literature, but the existence of the program was gener-
ally known in the aviation community.
319 See Simon Elliot, Beating The Bandits, FLIGHT INT'L, Nov. 2, 1994, at 36.
320 Id.
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tion.5 2 ' The system as it has been described by Avmark's
president calls for the application and integration of several dif-
ferent technologies to perform verification and authentica-
tion.32 Information concerning a particular part would be
supported by a database for those parts identified by the propri-
etary system . 2' The system would not allow universal access to
data concerning an individual subscriber's inventory for com-
petitive reasons.3 24
Avmark, among others in the air transport industry,325 is of
the opinion that the problem of counterfeit aircraft parts is not
well addressed by more regulation from the Federal govern-
ment.3 26 Avmark's president did not articulate her firm's rea-
sons for stating that regulation is a bad idea when lack of
competent regulation and enforcement has produced the prob-
lem which may benefit her firm and its process. Avmark merely
"disagrees" with it.3 27 It is also undetermined what position
would be taken with regard to the numerous violations of trade-
mark law, criminal law, and antitrust statutes which are a feature
of the underground parts landscape and which the Avmark sys-
tem would no doubt reveal.
For example, if the lineage and provenance of a subscriber's
inventory is proprietary, the ultimate decision whether to place
an underground part in service is still within the control of the
operator with no more oversight than there is currently. This
does not appear to address the problem of controlling the traf-
fic in underground parts and seems to fail at removing the in-
centives to traffic in such items. It may be argued that Avmark's
interest in the issue is more correctly ascribed as self-interest be-
cause comprehensive regulation and enforcement would make





325 See U.S.A.: Case of the Flying Bedspring-Bogus and Counterfeit Aircraft Compo-
nents, LONDON (U.K.) DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 19, 1993, at 17. In this article, Mike
Rioux, senior maintenance expert for the U.S. Air Transport Association, says
that a counterfeit part might be just as good as a genuine one. Id. In Rioux's
opinion, the airlines will never cut back on safety, and he really does not believe
that someone would knowingly produce parts that could down an airplane. Id.
Rioux's opinions are interesting, coming from a high official in the preeminent
industry association.




In short, all the APATS system could guarantee would be that
there was a history somewhere concerning a part bearing a pro-
prietary identifier which might or might not be accessible. The
system depends on total confidence in its integrity for its valid-
ity, and the ingenuity of evaders, if considered, is not dis-
cussed. 28 It would also add to the price of the part with the
requirement for an elaborate record-keeping database and
tracking system, without any corresponding benefit in security.
For those who participated, some benefit would be gained,
but many, not being under compulsion, would ignore the sys-
tem and lower their expenses by externalizing the costs associ-
ated with their operations. The system Avmark proposes has
built-in incentives for dissemblers and fakers and, thus, presents
no real unified approach to addressing and controlling the
problem of underground parts in a system of competent regula-
tion. Many who practice the criminal arts respond only to the
threat of penalties or sanctions, and a posture on Avmark's part
that discounts this reality or argues against further regulatory
efforts appears shortsighted. One commentator has suggested
that the situation calls out for more regulation, not less.12 9 Kai-
ser suggests that until recently international cooperation and co-
ordination and the question of licensing aircraft parts traders
were trade-related political issues, but since bootleg parts have
become common, licensing of parts traders and enforcement at
the international level are required to assure aviation safety.
3 30
In sum, the existence of systems such as that which Avmark
hopes to promote ought not to act as a bar to further regulation,
licensing of vendors, or effective enforcement on the part of
government. As good as it may be, the APATS system cannot
exert any direct influence over the customs, criminal justice,
and regulatory agencies of the many sovereign nations of the
world.
e. Other Technologies of Interest
Manufacturers of consumer goods have been active in the
fight against product counterfeiting, and the technologies in
place and emergent in those fields show considerable promise
for authenticating aircraft parts. Allied Corporation, faced with
328 My father once observed that nowhere is human intelligence and creativity
more clearly demonstrated than when fraud lies at the heart of the transaction.
329 Kaiser, supra note 193, at 300.
330 Id.
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the problem of low quality imitations of its products, has devel-
oped a proprietary system for authenticating its oil filters which
depends on a small metal tag packaged with every oil filter it
sellsA3 1 The easily implantable tag is made of a special alloy
unique to Allied Signal, the existence of which can be verified
by use of a low-cost scanner.3 3 2 Levi Strauss, the clothing manu-
facturer, has utilized a system of label verification using an opti-
cal scanning system designed by Light Signatures, a California
company.333 Interestingly, Light Signatures candidly admits that
it did not know whether the system is cost effective in Strauss's
case since the anticounterfeiting trend among manufacturers is
"embryonic. " 4 The problem of information exchange is com-
plicated because many manufacturers of consumer goods are re-
luctant to discuss their anticounterfeiting efforts or
technologies.3 3 5 American Banknote Company, in association
with other companies, has pioneered the use of holographic
technologies which have been used successfully to stop credit
card counterfeiting.33 6 Other emerging technologies, such as
embedding microscopic plastic chips or other distinctive items
in sprayable coatings, show some promise in source identifica-
tion of products.3 3 7
Interestingly, the firms which are presently utilizing an-
ticounterfeiting systems are using them for spot checks of retail-
ers, identifying distributors and sources of potential counterfeit
items and the like.3 3 8 Reliance on the legal system as the pri-
mary source of detection and control is not the preferred strat-
egy of the most forward thinking element of the business
community in the battle against product counterfeiting.
On the whole, the development of low-cost and easily used
scanning technology and verification and anti theft strategies in
retail commerce which are within the ken of the humblest shop
331 See Michael Neubarth, Fakebusters: How Technology Spots Counterfeits, POPULAR
Sci., Apr. 1986, at 102.
.32 Id.
333 See Mason, supra note 186, at 119.
334 Id.
335 Neubarth, supra note 331, at 102.
336 Id.
337 See John Schwartz, Technology Used to Tag Explosives Gets Second Look After
Bombing, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at A8; Graciela Sevilla, Keeping Track of a Dog's
Life: Imprinting Implanting Keep Pets from a Life on the Streets, WASH. POST, June 23,
1993, at Dl; EARS System Tracks Sows, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Mid-March 1996, at
15-16.
338 Neubarth, supra note 331, at 102.
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clerk is a phenomenon which ought to make the members of
the aircraft industry who argue that effective anticounterfeiting
strategies are too expensive and uncertain to implement pause.
f. Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition, and Other
Legal Strategies
A trademark is defined as follows:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof [that is] (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has
a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register
on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 39
Trademarks identify the origin of a product, even though that
origin may not be known to the purchaser.340 Trademarks are
said to symbolize the somewhat nebulous concept of goodwill by
providing, at a minimum, verifiability of source identification to
purchasers, and in so doing, trademarks are an assurance of
quality and consistency for the purchaser.3 41 Trademarks can
consist of words which allow direct identification, such as Pam-
pers or Tylenol. Names or slogans serving as source identifica-
tion, such as The Heartbeat of America (Chevrolet) or graphic
images such as the stork (Vlasic pickles), are considered trade-
marks, as are devices such as the shape or distinctive appearance
of a package or a product which indicates the source or origin
of the product.342
Part numbers and alphanumeric markings on aircraft parts
are protectable as trademarks under certain conditions. In Wil-
liams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,343 an aircraft engine manufacturer's
part number had a single letter prefix added by a competitor
who then proceeded to utilize the number in its parts lists and
339 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
340 Laurence H. Pretty, Overview of Basic Principles of Trademark Law and Unfair
Competition, in UNDERSTANDING BAsIC TRADEMARK LAw 1993, at 103 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Practice Course Handbook Series
No. G4-3901, 1993).
341 Id. For a well-reasoned and comprehensive decision which surveys the com-
mon law of trademarks and which touches on many of the issues under discus-
sion, see El Modelo Cigar Mfg. Co. v. Gato, 7 So. 23 (Fla. 1890).
342 Pretty, supra note 340, at 107.
343 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1982).
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as an identifier on its reverse engineered parts.3 44 The court
viewed this act as trademark infringement, because the part
number was a proprietary drawing number.345 In general, num-
bers on their own cannot be exclusively appropriated as trade-
marks, but may be protected as trademarks if they indicate
ownership or origin. 46 Marks which indicate quality or grade,
on their own, are not trademarks, but a single letter, if adopted,
is.34 7 Inspection stamps, PMA symbols, the five-number federal
source identifier many aircraft firms apply to their parts, and the
like are also considered trademarks because they identify the
product as having a unique and discrete origin.
It may be inferred that, under most conditions, a part number
referable to a proprietary drawing can be considered a trade-
mark; thus, application of such a number by a seller of under-
ground aircraft parts leaves him or her open to a charge of
trademark infringement. In conjunction with application of
other marks which serve to provide source identification, liabil-
ity for trademark infringement is nearly certain.
The act of passing off one's product as that of another in an
attempt to take advantage of the competitor's goodwill and rep-
utation is a paradigm act of unfair competition, as well as an
abuse of the consumer's trust.3 48 In the Coats case, the Supreme
Court remarked that regardless of the trademark issue, competi-
tors have no right to dress their goods to deceive the public and
trade on the plaintiffs reputation. 49 It is "an attempt by one
person to induce customers to believe that his products are actu-
ally those of another. 3 5 0 Deceptive practices of this nature em-
body some of the elements of common law forgery, and some
states recognize trademark counterfeiting as a type of forgery. 5 1
3- Id. at 169.
345 Id. at 170.
34 Id. at 174. See Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893); In re
Union Oil Co., 88 F.2d 492 (Ct. Cust. App. 1937); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that the number 386
was a generic term, and plaintiff never asserted rights to numerical designators it
used).
-7 See Autoline Oil Co. v. Indian Ref. Co., 3 F.2d 457 (D. Md. 1924).
348 The phrase "rip-off" was never more aptly applied to a business practice.
349 Coats, 149 U.S. at 566.
350 Remco Indus. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 954 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
397 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1968).
35' For example, see State v. Trumbull, 187 A.2d 445 (Conn. Cir. Ct.), cert.
denied, 204 A.2d 935 (Conn. 1962) (counterfeiting bearing manufacturer's car-
tons so as to pass off surplus as the genuine article is prosecutable as forgery);
andJacobs v. State, 640 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (counterfeit trademark
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A plaintiff sets out a prima facie case of passing off (for pur-
poses of federal law) by demonstrating the following: (1) a false
or misleading representation of the source or origin of the
goods was made; (2) there is a likelihood of confusion in the
mind of the public about the source or origin of the goods; (3)
the confusion is a result of the false representation; and (4) the
goods were used in interstate commerce. 52 Long suggests that
a plaintiff ought to use the following evidence to substantiate
that passing off has occurred: (1) evidence of the distinctive na-
ture of the mark at issue or the existence of secondary meaning
in the public mind; (2) evidence of actual confusion in the pub-
lic mind; (3) the offender's prior knowledge of the plaintiffs
rights in the mark or marks; and (4) use of similar packaging or
false representations as to the source of the goods.353
Another writer suggests that manufacturers faced with the
threat of counterfeit imitations of their products have available
several current strategies to combat the problem.35 4 Bush sug-
gests manufacturers can explore the following avenues: (1) ag-
gressive pursuit and prosecution of product counterfeiters; (2)
reward honest distributors financially for avoiding counterfeit or
knockoff goods; (3) use legal action to drive up the price of sell-
ing counterfeits and thus erase any comparable advantage
gained by the vendor selling the imitation; (4) let it be known
that offenders will not escape prosecution; and (5) build inter-
nal knowledge and monitoring systems for product distribution
systems.3 55
Some states adopted criminal simulation statutes based on
Model Penal Code section 224.2 which criminalizes the practice
of making or altering a product to give a false appearance of
antiquity or origin that it does not have or if the offender vali-
dates, possesses with intent to sell, or offers such an item for
sale.356 The leading case in interpreting the law of criminal sim-
on sportswear is considered forgery). But see People v. Vu, 616 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup.
Ct. 1994) (forgery requires intent to deceive as a necessary element); State v.
Reese, 388 A.2d 122 (Md. 1978) (forgery defined as manufacturing a spurious
document).
'52 DoRIs E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAM AcT 216 (1993).
353 Id. at 220.
354 See Ronald F. Bush et. al., Remedies for Product Counterfeiting, Bus. HORIZONS,
Jan. 1, 1989, at 59.
55 Id.
356 Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statutes Pe-
nalizing "Criminal Simulation" of Goods or Merchandise, 72 A.L.R. 4TH 1071, 1073
(1989 & Supp. 1995).
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ulation regarding counterfeit goods is State v. Frampton.3 57 A de-
fendant who sold bogus Wilson baseball gloves with an
aggregate value of over $1000 challenged the statute by assert-
ing that it had been preempted by federal law and was vague
and overbroad.5 The court indicated that the Utah statute was
not preempted because it did not interfere with the right of an
offended party to seek redress under the Lanham Act and also
held that the subject matter of the statute could be applied to
those who forge or alter modern articles of commerce. 359 The
court also held that the amount of the fraud was the amount
which the seller received or offered for the goods.3 6 ° Conse-
quently, since the seller had offered the gloves at a price of forty
dollars and had thirty-eight gloves in his possession, the seller
was properly convicted of felony criminal simulation because
the total value of the goods exceeded one thousand dollars. 61
In another case, a New York court found that modem com-
mercially manufactured products, in this case jewelry fraudu-
lently stamped as 14kt or 18kt gold, are within the subject
matter of criminal simulation statutes because the statutes are
extensions of forgery law beyond writings or documents, and are
designed to protect the consumer against the acts of those who
make or alter goods to give a false impression of rarity or ori-
357 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).
358 Id. at 190-91, 193.
359 Id. at 191. The Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 &
Supp. 1985).
360 Frampton, 737 P.2d at 196. See also People v. Kim, 621 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct.
1994) (for the purpose of prosecution, valuation of counterfeit goods must be
based on the value given by affixing the false trademark).
361 Frampton, 737 P.2d at 196. The Utah criminal simulation statute, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-518 (1995), and its analogs appear to be more specific than
Iowa's fraudulent practices law, IOWA CODE § 714.8 (1995), which limits itself in
the counterfeit parts context to a person who "manufactures or possesses a false
or counterfeit label, with the intent that it be placed on merchandise to falsely
identify its origin or quality;" or one who "knowingly attaches or alters any label
to any goods offered or kept for sale so as to materially misrepresent the quality
or quantity of such goods, or the maker or source of such goods;" or a person
who "removes, alters or defaces any serial or identification number or any own-
ers' identification mark from any property not the person's own." IOWA CODE
§ 714.8. The Iowa statute thus appears to require a volitional act with regard to a
label or identification tag for purposes of misrepresentation and does not make it
a crime to alter the serial number on one's own property. However, IOWA CODE
§ 714.16(2)(a), the consumer fraud statute, classifies all such acts as unlawful
practices, which are prosecutable by the state as civil actions, and the state may
assess penalties of $40,000 per violation.
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gin. 62 A later New York case added to this line of analysis when
it upheld the conviction under the criminal simulation statutes
of a defendant who altered a large number of wristwatches to
appear more valuable because of their supposed source or
origin. 363
It appears that the New York courts have thus retreated from
an earlier decision holding that a modern, commercially manu-
factured counterfeit watch lacked "the necessary element of an-
tiquity, rarity, source, or authorship" to invoke the criminal
simulation statute.364 In People v. Tanner,363 a case involving
counterfeit sweatshirts, the court observed that "[n]either the
language of Penal Law 170.45 nor the legislative history of the
statute show that it should be restricted, as the court in James
held, to antiques or other rare objects .... The purpose of the
law . . . is to protect the buying public from deception and
trickery."3 66
The Texas and Arizona courts that have considered the crimi-
nal simulation statutes have dealt with the problem of simulated
antiques and forged documents. In Texas, the court held that a
dealer in antiques who had fraudulently validated the authentic-
ity of two bronze scarab beetles, when in fact they were of mod-
ern and common origin was chargeable under the statute.367
The defendant had been convicted of theft in the aftermath of a
sting operation which targeted his shop, and prosecutors argued
the offense was not chargeable as criminal simulation because
there was no effort to make the scarabs appear to be rarities. 68
The court differed, holding that an underlying assumption of
the case against the defendant was that some unknown person
made the goods falsely appear to have value or quality because
of their apparent age.3 69 Thus, the defendant's knowing au-
thentication of the scarabs violated the criminal simulation stat-
ute. Other Texas courts have criticized this case on the issue
of whether the criminal simulation statute ought to be treated as
in pari materia with theft statutes, although the basic application
362 People v. Hafif, 491 N.Y.S.2d 226, 227-28 (Crim. Ct. 1985).
363 People v. Thai, 542 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
364 People v. James, 361 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (Crim. Ct. 1974).
365 582 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Crim. Ct. 1992).
W Id. at 643.
367 Tawfik v. State, 643 S.W.2d 127, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
3N8 Id. at 127-28.
m Id.
370 Id. at 129.
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of the criminal simulation statute to the act of falsely authenti-
cating articles of commerce appears untouched.371
In Arizona, a court held that an "object," as the term is used
in the criminal simulation statute, did not apply to a writing as
defined in the forgery statute because the criminal simulation
statute was directed at the problems of faked antiques and art
treasures.372 The Arizona court discussed the inclusion of crimi-
nal simulation as a lesser offense in a case involving allegedly
forged checks.373 The court noted that the intent of the statute
was directed at forged works of art, antiques, and natural ob-
jects.3 74 Thus, such an "object" could not be considered as be-
ing within the ambit of the forgery statute, and criminal
simulation could not therefore be considered as a lesser-in-
cluded-offense to the crime of forgery.3 7 5
Application of the criminal simulation statutes has some util-
ity regarding the problem of underground aircraft parts, partic-
ularly where state law recognizes the offense and may represent
a usable avenue for control of underground parts where the is-
sue of personal jurisdiction can be established.
g. Recent Legislative Efforts
In addition, some states have been in the forefront of product
counterfeiting legislation and protection of intellectual property
rights. A case in point is the recently enacted South Carolina
Trademarks and Service Marks Act of 1993 anticounterfeiting
statute which makes intentional trafficking in goods or services
with knowledge of counterfeit marks or in situations where par-
ties ought to have known of the counterfeit mark illegal. 76
South Carolina has been joined in this effort by Florida, New
York, and North Carolina. In addition, California has enhanced
its existing penalties for trademark counterfeiters in response to
371 See Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (distinguishing
between the forbidden conduct of criminal simulation as deception and the for-
bidden conduct of theft as acquisition); accord Steptoe v. State. 783 S.W.2d 9
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d
123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).




376 Trademarks and Service Marks Act of 1993, 1994 S.C. Acts 486 (codified at
various sections of S.C. CODE ANN. § 39).
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annual losses of $7.5 billion and an estimated 25,000 jobs to the
counterfeit goods industry.3 77
Florida, which amended sections 831.03 and 831.05 of the
Florida Statutes to make counterfeiting of private labels or
trademarks a serious misdemeanor and in some cases a felony,
also provides for seizure of the goods bearing the counterfeit
marks by any law enforcement officer.3 78 New York recently
amended sections 165.72-.73 of the penal law, making trade-
mark counterfeiting a class E felony where the retail value of the
goods in question exceeds $1000 and a class C felony where the
value exceeds $100,000.379 North Carolina legislation enacted
this year makes application and use of counterfeit trademarks a
felony. 80
h. Other Statutory Avenues
The various state consumer fraud and deceptive trade prac-
tice statutes are primarily intended to prevent the machinations
of door to door aluminum siding salesmen, purveyors of miracle
driveway recoating treatments, and the like.3 8 1 However, there
is no reason that an interested attorney general could not pur-
sue and win a case involving counterfeit or fraudulently certified
aircraft parts or that an interested manufacturer or operator
might not convince an attorney general to go after a dishonest
broker or seller of such parts. In Iowa, the statute allows the
attorney general to pursue consumer fraud as a civil action and
assess penalties of $40,000 per violation. 82 Generally speaking,
if a party offered such items for sale in the state, did business in
a state, or otherwise threatened the health and safety of the resi-
dents of a state such as Iowa, personal jurisdiction would be as-
sured for the purposes of the consumer fraud statute.
Another novel approach to the problem of product counter-
feiting in general has been taken in New York. In 1165 Broadway
377 See Stacey M. Berg et. al., California Enhances Counterfeiting Penalties, 5 No. 12
J. PROPMETARY RTS. 36 (1993).
378 Act of June 15, 1995, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 95-300 (West) (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 831.03, .05).
379 Act of Aug. 2, 1995, N.Y. Laws ch. 535 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL LAw
§§ 165.72-.73).
380 Act ofJuly 13, 1995, N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 436 (West) (to be codified at 1995
N.C. GEN STAT. § 80-11.1).
381 For a good survey of the scope of state trademark law and its relationship to
federal law, see ArthurJ. Schwab, Trademark Rights and Remedies Under State Law, 5
No. 6J. PROPMETARY RTS. 2 (1993).
382 IOWA CODE § 714.16 (1995).
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Corp. v. Dayana of N. Y. Sportswear, Inc., 83 the landlord of a com-
mercial building commenced eviction proceedings against the
tenant because the tenant was engaged in the manufacture of
counterfeit sportswear contrary to state law.384 The tenant ar-
gued that the statute permitting landlords to institute eviction
against tenants engaged in illegal businesses was an impermissi-
bly broad reading of the statute and that the statute should only
be applied where the uses endangered the health and safety of
the community.38 5 The court held that the proscription against
illegal activity was plain on the face of the statute.386 The teach-
ing of the 1165 Broadway case is that creative use of existing stat-
utes such as New York's real property law may be made in the
effort to suppress the trade in counterfeit aircraft parts.3 7
2. Toward a Rationalized System of Regulation-Risk Assessment vs.
Positivism
There are differences of opinion regarding the extent to
which underground parts compromise safety and the steps
which ought to be taken. One commentator noted that the fact
that a part lacks documentation which demonstrates its con-
formity with approval provisions of 14 C.F.R. section 21 does not
necessarily indicate that it is improperly made, defective, or sub-
standard since it might have been directly sold by a manufac-
turer who lacks PMA approval.388 However, he states that there
is "no principled basis upon which an end user may presume
that it actually conforms to type design. "389 Beach observes that
"[t] he primary risk to air safety is posed by counterfeit and other
nonconforming parts which are manufactured in secret by un-
approved and unqualified producers who have neither access to
type design information nor a moral or economic interest in en-
suring that the parts they produce conform to approved
data."3 9 0
383 633 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1995). See Alvin L. Arnold & Marshall E.
Tracht, Landlord-Tenant: Landlord May Be Liable for Tenant's Trademark Infringe-
ment, 24 REAL EST. L. REP. 3 (Nov. 1994).
1165 Broadway Corp., 633 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 726-28 (recitation of other illegal activity which the statute and its
analogues have been used to suppress).
387 See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAw § 715(1) (McKinney 1994).





Along with the Aerospace Industries Association, Flight Safety
Foundation, Regional Airlines Association, and the Canadian
Ministry of Transport, Michael Rioux, speaking for the Air
Transport Association, takes the position that parts brokers and
suppliers ought to be regulated. Rioux further opines that air-
lines are "extremely cautious" about selecting sources for spare
parts and rely on reputable suppliers as a vital link in the supply
chain. 91
David Hinson, FAA Administrator, states flatly that suspected
unapproved parts do not pose a significant safety problem for
the air transport system. 92 Anthony Broderick, FAA Associate
391 Id. (statement of Michael Rioux).
392 Id. (statement of David A. Hinson). Mr. Hinson has a unique view of what
constitutes a "safety problem," and I certainly hope he feels the same way about
the products he and his family purchase at the corner pharmacy. See Mason,
supra note 186, at 119. For examples of some bogus parts related air safety
problems which may have escaped Mr. Hinson's steely gaze, see Pasztor, supra
note 175, at B6 (gearboxes installed on F18 fighters which bore fraudulent test-
ing reports were responsible for 70 emergency landings and 40 other system fail-
ures including engine fires); FSF Probe Says Bogus Parts Problem Grows As Regulators
Fiddle, AIR SAFETY WK., Feb. 7, 1994 (unapproved tail rotor shaft nuts linked to
crash of helicopter in U.K.); Marchak, supra note 267, at 1A (two men arrested
who sold at least 14 uncertified scrap crankshafts which fit small commuter
planes; parts distributor falsified information in reselling engines from airliner
destroyed by fire; NTSB says several civilian helicopter crashes caused by counter-
feit parts in U.S.); Dallas Man Pleads Guilty in Bogus Parts Scheme, U.S. Department
of Transportation News Release 95-94, June 23, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994
WL 279208 (parts reseller fraudulently certified that turbine disks were never
exposed to severe stress or heat when aircraft on which they were previously in-
stalled crashed in 1989 in Brazil); NDT Firms Indicted on False Aircraft Parts Inspec-
tions, NDT UPDATE, Nov. 1, 1992 (falsified records of ultrasonic inspections of
critical aircraft parts, which were never performed); Florida Man Sentenced in Bogus
Parts Scheme, U.S. Department of Transportation News Release 08-95, Feb. 6,
1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 45518 (parts broker conspired to falsely
certify aircraft parts); Andrew McIntosh, Danger in the Air; Industry, Government
Take Aim at Aircraft Parts Black Market, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Feb. 11, 1995, at GI
(Canadian Transport Safety Board found counterfeit helicopter blades in wreck-
age of a flying school helicopter, although deficient maintenance caused the
crash, and subsequently discovered existence of a dozen more pairs); Anna Cifelli
Isgro, The Hidden Threat to Air Safety: Substandard and Bogus Spare Parts May Be
Causing Crashes, FORTUNE, Apr. 13, 1987, at 81 (helicopter crash which killed traf-
fic reporterJane Dornacker suspected to have been caused by faulty clutch whose
parts did not meet government specifications); Edward H. Phillips, FAA Targets
Lycoming Piston Engine Bolts, AviATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 27, 1995, at 36
(failed connecting rod bolts caused forced landing of Cessna 177 RG; 2,473
counterfeit bolts had been shipped to customers; FAA issued emergency airwor-
thiness directive); Two Men Sentenced in Plot to Sell Stolen Blueprints of Aircraft Parts,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 29, 1994, at 21A (men who stole blueprints from
aircraft engine manufacturer apprehended in attempt to sell them to independ-
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Administrator for Regulation and Certification, stated that he
had "not found a benefit to accrue from the regulation of sup-
pliers."3 93 He feels that more regulation will not prove a bar to
the criminal, and deceives the public into thinking that there is
some benefit to be gained by more regulation.3 94 Broderick is of
the opinion that no breakdown of responsibility is occurring,
possibly because the ultimate source of responsibility is the in-
staller of the part, 95 and the fact that the air transport system is
safe proves that more regulation is not needed. 96 In fact, Brod-
erick rejects the notion that a complete "chain of custody"
ought to be maintained for parts held by users.3 97 Broderick
rejected an industry group request for mandatory registration of
suppliers.3 9 ' AvMark, as previously noted, is against further reg-
ulation of parts suppliers.3 99
Although the views of those who believe that further regula-
tion is not needed because the safety benefits are not shown in
the record have some currency, their arguments do not address
the fact that, as Beach points out, lack of documentation means
that there is no reliable basis for anyone to conclude that a
ent parts producer); Scott Sunde, Probe of Bogus Boeing Parts Widens Companies in
Texas, Illinois Named in Indictment, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 7, 1995, at
A23 (vendors in three states involved in a large scale counterfeiting effort involv-
ing slat roller bolts); Rick Eyerdam, Black Market Thrives for Aircraft Parts, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 1 (after Hurricane Andrew, scavengers from all over
United States descended on wreckage, stripping planes of equipment, data
plates, engines, and parts to be sold on black market); Bogus Parts Have Plagued
the Aviation Industry for Decades, FLIGHT SAFETY DIG.,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 3-6 (bootleg
wing bolts on DC-3 broke when torqued; nose gear collapsed on landing of DHC
Dash-7 aircraft with 42 aboard caused by bootleg part in nose gear down lock
actuator, jamming nose gear).
393 Perry Flint, All Parts Are Not Created Equal AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, July 1,
1994, at 40.
394 Id.
395 For an example of the consequences ordinary working people have to deal
with when responsibility is sloughed off onto them by the "authorities," see Ha-
waiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2242-43 (1994). When highly
placed regulators and managers lower the entire burden of controlling the un-
derground parts industry on the shoulders of overworked aviation mechanics,
something is very wrong indeed. Conclusory statements that the ultimate source
of responsibility is in the installer cannot relieve others of their responsibilities in
this matter.
396 Flint, supra note 393, at 40. This view is in direct opposition to that of many
in the aviation community. Id.
397 Id.
398 James Ott, Twin Task Forces Battle Bogus Parts, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 15, 1993, at 33.
399 See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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given part is airworthy or conforms .with type design. Further, as
James Frisbee pointed out, where the flight crew is dead and
cannot testify as to why they lost control, it is unlikely that an
investigation team can identify an equipment failure when the
aircraft is spread in pieces over several acres of ground.4"'
The oppositionists also do not confront the issue of wide-
spread criminality in the reselling black market-indicating
clearly that the involved parties themselves are not concerned
with safety. The "risk assessment" lens being used by some
within the FAA concerning the subject of air safety is a new and
disturbing point of view which bodes ill for the aviation commu-
nity and in the particular circumstances posed by the black mar-
ket in aircraft parts has little to recommend itself as a predictive
tool.40 1 On the contrary, it represents the view of those who,
standing on a diving board on a pitch dark night, prepare to
leap on the theory that nothing bad has happened yet, so there
is no reason to conclude that the pool is not full. Risk assess-
ment as a justification for policy depends for its utility on relia-
ble knowledge of the various risk factors involved, which are
derived after long and careful study. It can hardly be said to be
reliable where key elements of the statistical base, such as a stan-
dardized terminology, a reliable and accurate reporting system
and a means of assessing human criminality, are missing.
The FAA Suspected "Unapproved Parts" Task Force recently
released a report detailing what it believes the FAA's role in the
unapproved parts controversy ought to be, possibly at the prod-
ding of the Inspector General.40 2 Most of the recommendations
that are made in the task force report are directed at issues of
policy, information exchange, and definition, and there is little
in the report that would lead to an immediate resolution of the
unapproved parts problem. The task force's thirty recommen-
dations,40 3 while needed, are incremental in nature and cannot
be expected to bear fruit rapidly or bring pressure to bear on
the sellers of bootleg parts in the short term.
40 Hearings, supra note 41 (statement of James M. Frisbee).
401 Id. (statement of David R. Hinson).
402 See generally PROGRAM PLAN, supra note 315. The placement of parentheses
around the term "Unapproved Parts" in the title of this report, Suspected "Unap-
proved Parts" Program Plan, and the name of the task force itself, FAA Suspected
"Unapproved Parts" Task Force, is food for thought for the paranoid, and it begs
the question of why this obvious exercise in style was thought necessary.
403 Id. at app. G.
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The overall goals of the task force's proposed program plan
are to clarify FAA unapproved parts policies, standardize the use
of terminology, establish a national program office and an en-
hanced parts reporting system, improve cooperation with law
enforcement, pay more emphasis to receiving inspections, clar-
ify responsibilities of maintenance persons, expedite the
rulemaking process, improve FAA in-house training, define
scrap disposal procedures, and define procedures which could
allow the timely removal of unapproved parts from stocks as well
as from aircraft.40 4
The only substantive recommendations made in the program
plan are to make the reporting process for suspected unap-
proved parts mandatory40 5 and to require destruction of scrap
parts,4 "6 although the report declined to address the conse-
quences of such a rule.40 7 A second rulemaking effort endorsed
by the task force was to "prohibit any person from making a
fraudulent or intentionally false statements involving a record
that represents the acceptability of an aircraft product, part, or
material for use in civil aircraft. " 4° 8 This appears to be duplica-
tive of existing law since such deliberately false and misleading
statements are already prohibited and prosecutable under a
multitude of federal and state statutes. As well, this recommen-
dation does not appear to address the issue of making such
statements concerning parts which are intended for use on mili-
tary aircraft and thus offers no protection where parts have dual
usage (as many do) and the vendor chooses to misrepresent
their condition with a caveat that they are fit for military use
only.
The agency task force did not support mandatory registration
or licensing of parts resellers or brokers, but supports a volun-
tary program of broker and reseller accreditation being pro-
moted by industry and FAA. 409 This program proposes to select
auditing firms and auditors who would then audit firms and bro-
kers seeking accreditation. 410 "Special enforcement considera-
404 Id. at 1-5 to 1-8.
405 Id. at app. G (recommendation 6).
406 Id. at 6-18 to 6-20.
407 Id. at 6-20.
408 Id. at app. G (recommendation 8).
40 Id. at 6-4 to 6-6.
410 FAA & Industry Move Forward with Parts Broker Accreditation Plan, U.S. Depart-




tion" would be used to police the system.41" ' Thus, if an operator
using an approved distributor installed an unapproved part,
only the distributor would be subject to enforcement. 12 If an
operator used an unaccredited distributor, both the operator
and the distributor would be subject to enforcement action.41 3
Apart from the obvious constitutional and liability arguments
that such a two-tiered system of law enforcement raises, there
are serious legal questions raised by a system of law enforcement
that would selectively prosecute some vendors and operators
based on their lack of participation or membership in an alleg-
edly voluntary scheme of self-regulation. Further, such a plan
would escalate the already significant price differences between
the legitimate manufacturer and distributor's products and
those of the less scrupulous vendor and thus, paradoxically, in-
crease rather than decrease the rewards for cheating.
In addition, the task force recommended that FAA obtain leg-
islative authority to seize and destroy counterfeit parts, although
it was not specified how this would be accomplished, and such a
provision may be duplicative of existing law.41 4
Fashioning an effective program of controlling the excesses of
the aircraft parts industry must cope with political realities as
they are found in the post modern era. Thus, a program which
argues for a significant increase in agency costs or regulatory
burdens faces the prospect of an uphill battle for funding in an
era of declining budgets, deficits, and government deconstruc-
tion. Nonetheless, a certain level of oversight is appropriate if
only because even fiscal conservatives would probably concede
that the job of assuring air safety is too important to be elimi-
nated or privatized, particularly where lack of effective controls
in the market is at least partially responsible for the problem of
unapproved parts.41 5
Any approach to the issue must recognize that there are four




414 PROGRAM PLAN, supra note 315, at app. G (recommendation 14).
415 SeeJames Ott, Reform Issues, Cuts in Budget Rock FAA, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 3, 1995, at 29. Not everyone agrees. The situation Ott describes is
reminiscent of that of the farmer who thought feed for his draft horse too expen-
sive. The solution appeared to be to train the horse to work without eating.
About ten days later, the horse seemed to be getting used to the idea when it
unfortunately died.
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of the parts themselves, rationalization of existing regulatory
structures, installing a coherent and standardized technology of
identification and accounting which is easy to use and hard to
fool, and increasing the level of surveillance in the marketplace.
Additionally, it is worthwhile to note that preventing the manu-
facture or introduction of a bootleg part into commerce is as
valid a control strategy as detection and elimination of existing
parts or punishing offenders after the fact, and probably is con-
siderably less expensive on a unit basis. It is, in fact, locking the
barn door before the horse escapes, not after. Thus, the follow-
ing suggestions are offered as possible approaches to the
problems discussed.
a. Meaningful Quality Assurance and Training
The first line of defense for any operator or repair facility in
defending itself from suspected unapproved parts is the aware-
ness, integrity, knowledge, authority, and independence of its
staff, particularly parts persons, quality assurance inspectors, and
mechanics, for they are responsible for certifying that materials
and repairs conform to type specifications and applicable
regulations.
The basis of effective quality assurance is independence, au-
thority, and technical expertise, combined with an inquiring
mind and substantial practical experience. Unfortunately, many
organizations do not have standardized and effective training
programs for quality assurance inspectors or a well-developed
idea of what sort of responsibilities an inspector or an inspection
department ought to be charged. Similarly, some firms do not
have such a philosophy for making their other employees aware
of their role in controlling suspected unapproved parts. Some-
times, the quality assurance function is seen as an obstacle to
production or a sinecure for superannuated mechanics, rather
than a central part of the entire operation. Output-oriented
managers who are boosters of the "production team" school sug-
gest that the task of inspection ought to be to facilitate produc-
tion by any and every means.
The thinking manager will at once realize that if the integrity
of the production and repair process cannot be accounted for at
every step by competent persons who are properly acquainted
with what the law requires, the integrity of the system and its
verifiability is not determinable. Such risks, being unknown,
cannot be intelligently weighed.
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It will be apparent that there are no responsibility require-
ments for aviation service managers, parts stock persons,
purchasing administrators, salesmen, secretaries, or ground-
skeepers. The only persons charged with the responsibility to
certify conformity are the persons performing the work, the per-
sons directly supervising when the actual worker is uncertifi-
cated, or the quality assurance inspector.
Regardless of the legal requirement for certification, the prac-
tical manager will grasp that all persons involved in parts supply
need to be properly trained in recognizing the unapproved
part. A well-thought out, ongoing, and substantial set of proce-
dures and training programs for these persons is necessary to
insure conformity with the regulations and the repair station
certificate and guarantee the integrity of the work performed by
focusing on assuring the traceability and airworthiness of all
parts used by the facility.416
b. Mandatory Reporting of Suspected Unapproved Parts
Within Forty-eight Hours-Designated Material
Examiners
A rule that required mandatory reporting of a suspected un-
approved part within forty-eight hours of becoming aware of its
questionable status, as well as mandatory reporting to the pro-
duction approval or certificate holder, could prove useful in
generating the level of reporting that would allow the agency
and component manufacturers to ascertain the scope and ex-
tent of the suspected unapproved parts problem and identify
problem manufacturers and resellers in an expeditious fashion.
In order to address the large number of inquiries that such a
policy would generate, a separate class of FAA-designated mate-
rial examiners could be created to resolve many questions con-
cerning suspected unapproved parts without additional burden
to the agency beyond certification and surveillance of the newly
created designees. This class of designees would be required to
submit findings to the agency and could be given the authority
to issue stop sale orders pending resolution of contested find-
ings of fact.
416 See 3 DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT Co., McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP., QuALTY ASSUR-
ANCE MANuAL, FAA CERTIFIED REPAIR STATION NUMBER ML3R688L (1991). For a
comprehensive and well-thought out procedure manual for repair station quality
assurance personnel, one cannot do much better than this document.
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c. Mandatory Mutilation of Unretained Parts
A requirement that all scrap parts and removable data plates
which are not returned to a primary manufacturer or author-
ized remanufacturer or retained by a repair facility for future
reconditioning be mutilated beyond repair before transfer to a
third party would eliminate one large source of black market
parts and misleading documentation. As part of this rule, a rec-
ord of retirement from service report would be required to be
transmitted to the manufacturer of the part or its successor so
that the manufacturer's database could be updated.
d. Manufacturer Serial Number/Subsequent History
Computer Bulletin Board
Manufacturers of serialized parts would be required to make
serial number and subsequent history records easily accessible
either by means of the Internet or by on-line BBS services and to
take steps to upgrade the quality and accuracy of their informa-
tion retrieval services. An opportunity for large database man-
agement firms such as credit reporting agencies could be
created to provide such a service at a modest cost. Facilities
should be provided so that parts personnel and receiving inspec-
tors can receive rapid verification of a part's certification status
for a modest fee. To minimize the adverse impact and confu-
sion that such a system might cause in the industry, a phase-in
period would be incorporated which could be retrospectively ex-
tended year by year, while incorporating current production
parts.
For manufacturers with a relatively modest production level, a
computerized bulletin board service utilizing a PC platform or
an Internet home page and a dedicated phone link could be
implemented rather inexpensively. Although this level of rec-
ord keeping represents more work for suppliers, it is worth re-
membering that large data management firms are used to
undertaking record keeping tasks of this magnitude. In short, if
TRW can maintain reasonably accurate credit histories on mil-
lions of Americans which can be accessed for a modest fee, the
technology exists to do the same for serialized aircraft parts.
e. Mandatory Registration and Licensing of Parts Resellers
The current position of the FAA and some sectors of the avia-
tion industry is that licensing of parts brokers and resellers is not
needed and will not produce any increase in air safety. How-
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ever, licensing would allow identification of persistent offenders
and high risk areas of the aircraft parts industry and would pose
no great barrier to the vast majority of legitimate businesses. Li-
censing, if adopted, should also allow for the identification of
the principals associated with corporate resellers. At some fu-
ture time, a bonding requirement or some proof of financial
responsibility as a requirement for licensing could be phased in
if conditions warranted it and the particular applicant was
deemed high risk. This information could be made accessible
for minimal cost through the same electronic channels created
to verify the certification status of other individuals and firms
subject to FAA certification.
f. Standardized Portable Identification Technology as the
Primary Method of Part Authentication and
Verification
This requirement could be as simple as a system of bar coding
and portable scanning devices such as those used by every UPS
delivery driver. Some have objected to the cost of this to the
individual repair station operator, but the inexpensive and com-
mon technology now readily available makes these objections of
little significance.4 17 With a phase-in period to allow every man-
ufacturer to incorporate permanently affixed bar codes to their
products by means of etching, this system would make it signifi-
candy more difficult to introduce unapproved parts into com-
merce. A phase-in period for further improvements in
technological verification methods is desirable. A permanent
oversight working group within the FAA to monitor technology,
make recommendations, and implement improvements could
be established. Adoption of a standardized technology should
not be a bar to proprietary systems of verification technology,
but should be the primary source of verification.
417 Software which allows the user to add bar codes to any graphic or printed
document is readily available. In conjunction with a modest investment in a per-
sonal computer and a trained operator, few parts producers or resellers in today's
world can argue that the price is prohibitive or that the utility of the technology is
speculative. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. Implantable passive tran-
sponder technology is the nightmare of aficionados of Dana Sculley and is cur-
rently in use both in implants meant to identify stray pets, microchips imbedded
in breast implants, livestock monitoring, and loss prevention systems familiar to
ordinary consumers.
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g. Rationalization and Limitation of the PMA and Repair
Station Rolls
As part of its audit, OIG determined that there was no easy
way to determine PMA status on any particular part. A first step
toward rationalization of the PMA process might be to declare
an open re-enrollment period and then remove from the rolls
all PMAs which were not renewed. Thereafter, all PMAs would
lapse every five years, subject to renewal, similar to the proce-
dure which is used to license manufacture of pesticides.4 18 Such
a process would remove large numbers of "stale" PMAs and
place the burden of continuing enrollment on those who bene-
fit most from it, and it would also allow for a periodic review of
PMA holders. In addition, PMA granting authority should be
subject to review by a centralized working group in the interest
of enforcement and oversight standardization.
A similar process should be enacted without delay to review all
repair station certificates, if only to remove from the rolls stale
certificates and those certificates which the holders are not enti-
fled to hold because they were improvidently granted or be-
cause lack of oversight has caused the holders to become lax in
their responsibilities. Additionally, a centralized working group
should be established without delay to oversee standardization
of the repair station certification process.
418 See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a) (1) (1994) (requirement for cancellation of registra-
tion of any pesticide at the end of five years unless the registrant requests
continuation).
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